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THE PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF LEGAL LIMITATIONS ON
THE FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF IN
THE UNITED STATES
Frederick Mark Gedicks*
To speak of the "permissible scope" of "legal limitations" on religious
liberty is to use the syntax in which religious liberty guarantees are written in
Europe. Such guarantees usually state a general definition of the freedom of
religion, and then set forth a variety of circumstances under which the
government may properly limit that liberty.' The American law of limitations
on freedom of religion is not easily stated in this grammar, because freedom of
religion in the United States is less a liberty right than an equality right. Since
the Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith,' the U.S.
Constitution has been understood to protect against government action that
intentionally burdens religious liberty, but not against action that incidentally
burdens religious liberty. In other words, government action that purposely
targets religious activity for a regulatory burden is constitutionally invalid,
whereas government action that burdens religious activity along with similarly
* Guy Anderson Chair & Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University,
Provo, Utah; gedicksf@lawgate.byu.edu. The author is grateful to Kristen Kemerer, Kim Pearson, and
(especially) Lee Andelin for their research assistance.
1 See, e.g., COSTITUZIONE [Constitution] art. 19 (Italy) ("Everyone has the right to profess freely his or
her own religious faith in any form whatsoever, individual or institutional, to proselytize such faith, and to
engage in its worship practices in private or public, so long as this does not involve rituals contrary to public
morality.") (author's translation), reprinted in CODICE DEL DIRIrrO EccLEsIAsTIco 9 (Giuffr ed., 3d ed.
1993); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
art. 9, §§ 1-2, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, amended by Protocol No. 11, Nov. 1, 1998, available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Convention/webConvenENG.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; this right includes
freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and
in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice, and
observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the
protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others.
Id.
2 See 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
3 id.
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situated secular activity as the consequence of the government's pursuit of a
legitimate regulatory goal is presumptively valid. Articulated in terms of
"limitations," the law in the United States is that religious activity generally
may be limited for any reason other than anti-religious animus. Although this
appears to leave freedom of religion fully exposed to government insensitivity
or indifference to incidental burdens that its actions may impose on religion,
the equality-shaped contours of constitutional doctrine in the United States
buffers religious beliefs and practices from such burdens by enabling believers
in many circumstances to claim the same protection as that afforded by
government to the beliefs and practices of those conmmitted to secular
ideologies and moralities.
I. SOURCES OF LAW ESTABLISHING AND LIMITING THE MANIFESTATION OF
RELIGIOUS BELIEF
A. International Law
International human rights law has played virtually no role in the
construction of doctrine relating to religious freedom in the United States.
Supreme Court majority opinions rarely cite international human rights
documents as authority for holdings bearing on the existence or scope of
individual constitutional rights.4 As one American scholar has put it, lawyers,
judges, and scholars in the United States normally limit themselves to
"debating the meaning and significance of our Constitution, our history, and
4 Patrick M. McFadden, Provincialism in United States Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 4, 4 (1995). For
example, only two Supreme Court majorities have cited the Universal Declaration of Human Rights since its
passage in 1948, with neither giving it more than a cursory mention. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 n.13
(1965) (noting that the Universal Declaration was quoted in the legislative history of the statute under review);
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 161 n.16 (1963) (noting the Declaration as one of numerous
authorities recognizing the "drastic consequences of statelessness"); see also Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct.
1183, 1199-1200 (2005) (citing UN Convention of the Rights of the Child and legal norms in other countries
in support of holding that constitutionally invalidates capital punishment for juveniles); Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (citing European Court of Human Rights decision that criminal prohibitions on
homosexual sodomy violate the European Convention on Human Rights); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
815, 831 n.34 (1988) (four-person majority opinion) (noting the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights as part of international opposition to the execution of juveniles). In recent years, citations to the
Universal Declaration have been mostly confined to dissenting opinions in death penalty cases. See, e.g.,
Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 390 n.10 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 824 n.5
(1987) (Powell, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 19
THE UNITED STATES
our precedents."5 Although the United States was prominent in the early effort
to universalize fundamental human rights,6  its current influence in the
international rights movement has waned as it has increasingly sought
exemptions from or has simply refused to ratify major covenants and




Religious freedom in the United States is textually rooted in the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses (often referred to collectively as the
"Religion Clauses") of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.8
Although the substantive content of the rights protected by the Religion
Clauses remains highly contested, the Court's recent doctrine suggests that, at
the least, the Clauses render presumptively invalid laws that single out a
5 Steven D. Smith, Intramural Dialogue and The Malaise of Religious Freedom, 35 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 359, 359 (2002) (book review); see also Stephen G. Wood & Brett G. Scharffs, Applicability
of Human Rights Standards to Private Corporations: An American Perspective, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 531, 544
(2002) ("As a general matter, the United States does not look to international law for enforceable legal norms
as frequently as do some other countries.").
6 See, e.g., JOHN ALLPHIN MOORE, JR. & JERRY PUBANTZ, To CREATE A NEW WORLD?: AMERICAN
PRESIDENTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS (1999) (assessing the considerable role played by U.S. presidents in
creating the United Nations and supporting its human rights initiatives). Former U.S. First Lady Eleanor
Roosevelt has been called "the most influential member of the U.N.'s Commission on Human Rights" for her
work on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Inst., Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, at http://www.udhr.org/history/frbioer.htm (last revised Aug. 5, 1998).
7 W. Kent Davis, Answering Justice Ginsburg's Charge that the Constitution is "Skimpy" in
Comparison to Our International Neighbors: A Comparison of Fundamental Rights in American and Foreign
Law, 39 S. TEX. L. REv. 951, 975-76 (1998); see also Wood & Scharffs, supra note 5, at 535 (noting
"resentment toward the Bush administration for unilateral stances on issues like global warming and missile
defense.. ."); Benjamin R. Barber, A Failure of Democracy, Not Capitalism, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2002, at
A19 (arguing that the U.S. determination to protect its own sovereignty by refusing to recognize international
human rights initiatives promotes global political instability).
8 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof..."). Although they originally only restricted the federal government, the
Religion Clauses and most of the other provisions of the Bill of Rights have since been extended to the states.
See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (Establishment Clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940) (Free Exercise Clause).
The U.S. Constitution also contains a prohibition on religious tests for federal office or employment.
See U.S. CONST. art. Vi, cl. 3 ("no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or
public Trust under the United States."). Although the Religious Test Clause has not been applied against the
States, there is no doubt that religious tests for state offices or employment violate the Establishment Clause.
See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (declining to apply the Religious Test Clause against the states,
but holding that a requirement that one affirm belief in God as a condition to acting as a notary public violates
the Establishment Clause).
2005]
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particular religion or religion generally for special burdens. 9 A number of
other clauses of the Constitution also include religious freedom under the
umbrella of broader rights protections. For example, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that the protections of the Speech Clause of the First
Amendment, which prohibits government action abridging the freedoms of
expression and association, l0 extend to religious speech and association.
11
Many of the Court's early decisions under the Speech Clause involved
religious speech, particularly by Jehovah's Witnesses. 12
Similarly, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides constitutional protection against religious discrimination.' 3 Suspicion
of government action that discriminates against particular religious
denominations is rooted in the very origins of modem equal protection
doctrine. 14  Contemporary decisions continue to group religious traits with
9 See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246, 260 (1982) (finding statute that subjected only certain
minority religions to fund-raising registration and reporting requirements to be suspect denominational
preference under the Establishment Clause which must be "closely fitted" to furthering a "compelling
governmental interest"); see also McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 638 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment) (stating that the Establishment Clause prohibits government from using religion "as a basis of
classification for the imposition of duties, penalties, privileges or benefits"). With respect to the Free Exercise
Clause, see Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993) ("Legislators
may not devise mechanisms, overt or disguised, designed to persecute or oppress a religion or its practices.").
10 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press..."). Although, like the Religion Clauses, the Speech and Press Clauses initially restricted only the
federal government, their prohibitions were also eventually applied against the states. See Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
1I See, e.g, Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S.
819 (1995); Capital Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v.
Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
12 See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); W. Va. State Bd. Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 3 10 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940).
13 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."). Although the Fourteenth Amendment
originally bound only the states, it was applied to federal government action in 1954. See Boiling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954).
14 See, e.g., Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271 (1951) (holding that denial of Jehovah's
Witnesses' application to use city park because of government distaste for Witnesses' beliefs violated the right
to equal protection of the laws and the exercise of those freedoms of speech and religion protected by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments); United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting
that a "presumption of constitutionality" should not attach to "statutes directed at particular religio[ns]");
American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89, 92 (1900) (suggesting that tax exemptions drawn on
the basis of "color, race, nativity, religious opinions, political affiliations or other considerations having no
possible connection with the duties of citizens as taxpayers" are "purely arbitrary, oppressive or capricious"
and deny "the equal protection of the laws to the less favored classes").
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racial ones as examples of inherently "suspect" or "arbitrary" bases of
classification which are presumptively unconstitutional, 15 although the Court
has never actually invalidated any government action on the ground that it
classifies on the basis of a generic or general "religion," as distinct from a
classification based on a particular religion or religious denomination.,
6
C. Codes and Statutes
The two most important federal statutes protecting religious freedom are
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA") 17 and the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA").' 8  RFRA
attempted to "restore" the law of religious exemptions that was in place prior
to Employment Division v. Smith, 19 by imposing on federal and state
governments the requirement of showing that any burden which they impose
on religious activity is necessary to a compelling government regulatory
interest, even when the burden is unintentional or incidental. 20 RFRA was
declared unconstitutional as applied to state government action in City of
Boerne v. Flores.21 Although language in Boerne suggested that RFRA might
22be unconstitutional as applied to federal as well as state government action,
15 E.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464-65 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911
(1995); Burlington N.R.R. Co. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648, 651 (1992); Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 186
(1992); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291 n.8 (1987); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. I, 17 (1979); New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
16 See Toby J. Heytens, Note, School Choice and State Constitutions, 86 VA. L. REV. 117, 142 (2000).
17 RFRA is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2000).
18 RLUIPA is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2000).
'9 494 U.S. at 872.
20 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b). Compare Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 830-
35 (1989), and Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987), and Thomas
v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981), and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
402-03 (1963) (each holding that government's refusal to grant unemployment insurance benefits to claimant
who lost job for refusing to work in violation of religious beliefs must be justified by a compelling interest),
with Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-16 (1972) (state's refusal to exempt Amish children from
compulsory schooling law must be justified by a compelling interest).
21 521 U.S. 507, 536(1997).
22 Id. at 535-36. The Court in Boerne noted:
Our national experience teaches that the Constitution is preserved best when each part of the
government respects both the Constitution and the proper actions and determinations of the other
branches. When the Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the province of the
Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law is. Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch,
at 177, 2 L.Ed. 60. When the political branches of the Government act against the background of
a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must be understood that in later
cases and controversies the Court will treat its precedents with the respect due them under settled
principles, including stare decisis, and contrary expectations must be disappointed. RFRA was
20051
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appellate courts that have considered the issue have upheld application of the
statute against federal action.
23
Enacted in the wake of Boerne' s invalidation of RFRA, RLUIPA reinstated
the compelling interest test for government action that burdens religious land
uses and the religious practices of incarcerated persons in connection with a
program or activity that receives federal funds or that affects interstate
commerce. 24  RLUIPA also invalidates all government action that burdens
religious land uses and religious practices of prisoners, when comparable
secular land uses and secular prisoner practices are not subject to such
burdens. 25  Federal appellate courts26 and district courts27 are divided on the
designed to control cases and controversies, such as the one before us; but as the provisions of
the federal statute here invoked are beyond congressional authority, it is this Court's precedent,
not RFRA, which must control.
Id.
Numerous commentators have argued that RFRA is infirm on separation of powers grounds as applied to
federal government action. See, e.g., Joanne C. Brant, Taking the Supreme Court at Its Word.- the Implications
for RFRA and Separation of Powers, 56 MONT. L. REV. 5 (1995); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G.
Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 NYU L. REV. 437, 469-73 (1994);
Eugene Gressman & Angela C. Carmella, The RFRA Revision of the Free Exercise Clause, 57 OHIO ST. L.J.
65, 119-25, 132-39 (1996); Marci A. Hamilton, City of Boerne v. Flores: A Landmark for Structural Analysis,
39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 699, 718-21 (1998); Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act is
Unconstitutional, Period, I U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 14-19 (1998). But see Gregory P. Magarian, How to Apply
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to Federal Law Without Violating the Constitution, 99 MICH. L. REV.
1903, 1923-32 (2001) (arguing that the application of RFRA to federal government action is merely a
precommitment by Congress to forbear from exercising its delegated powers to the fullest possible extent, and
thus entails no exercise of congressional power at all).
23 See, e.g., O'Bryan v. Bureau of Prisons, 349 F.3d 399, 401 (7th Cir. 2003); Guam v. Guerrero, 290
F.3d 1210, 1219-1220 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227
F.3d 1110, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000); Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 831-32 (9th Cir.
1999)); United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1126 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d
950, 959-60 (10th Cir. 2001)); Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 831-32 (9th Cir.
1999); Young v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 141 F.3d 854, 859-62 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 811 (1998); see also Magarian, supra note 22, at 1916 ("Most federal courts confronted with RFRA
claims simply have assumed the Act remains valid as to federal law."). Although the federal courts have held
that RFRA is constitutional as applied to federal government action, most federal RFRA claims have been
denied on the merits. See id. at 1962-63 nn.266-67 (reporting that as of 2001, thirteen appellate and eighteen
trial courts had denied federal RFRA claims on the merits, as against two appellate and six trial courts that had
upheld them); see also Ira C. Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 575 (1998)
(documenting a similar pattern in federal and state RFRA claims prior to Boerne).
24 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a) (2000).
25 Id. § 2000cc(b).
26 See Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1235-43 (11 th Cir. 2004), cert. denied
125 S. Ct. 1295 (2005) (upholding RLUIPA as a valid exercise of Congress' § 5 power under the Fourteenth
Amendment and as against First Amendment and Tenth Amendment challenges); Charles v. Verhagen, 348
F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding RLUIPA as a valid exercise of congressional power under the Spending
Clause, as against Tenth Amendment and Establishment Clause challenges); Mayweathers v. Newland, 314
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constitutionality of the statute, but the Supreme Court recently upheld a portion
of the statute. 8
The constitutions and statutes of some states are also significant sources for
the protection of religious exercise. The courts of some states have interpreted
their own state constitutional provision protecting the free exercise of religion
to mandate application of the pre-Smith compelling interest test to state laws
that incidentally burden religious activity,29  and one state amended its
constitution to require application of the compelling interest test to such laws.
30
A number of states have enacted statutes providing for similar protections.
31
Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 32 however, federal law
F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding RLUIPA as valid exercise of congressional power under the
Spending Clause, as against Establishment Clause, Tenth Amendment, Eleventh Amendment, and separation
of powers challenges). For careful analyses of the constitutionality of RLUIPA, see Caroline R. Adams, Note,
The Constitutional Validity of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: Will
RLUIPA 's Strict Scrutiny Survive the Supreme Court's Strict Scrutiny?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2361 (2002);
Shawn Jensvold, The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA): A Valid
Exercise of Congressional Power?, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 1 (2001); see generally Magarian, supra note 22.
27 Compare Gerhardt v. Lazaroff, 221 F. Supp. 2d 827, 846-50 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (upholding RLUIPA as
valid exercise of congressional power under the Spending Clause, as against Establishment Clause, Tenth
Amendment, and Eleventh Amendment challenges), and Freedom Baptist Church v. Township of Middletown,
204 F. Supp. 2d 857, 868-76 (E.D. Penn. 2002) (upholding RLUIPA as valid exercise of congressional power
under the Commerce Clause and § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment), with Al Ghashiyah v. Dep't of Corr., 250
F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1034 (E.D. Wis. 2003) (holding that RLUIPA violates the Establishment Clause), and
Madison v. Riter, 240 F. Supp.2d. 566, 582 (W.D. Va. 2003) (same).
28 See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113 (2005).
29 See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 237-38 (Mass. 1994); People v. DeJonge, 501
N.W.2d 127, 135 (Mich. 1993); State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 397-98 (Minn. 1990); Humphrey v.
Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039, 1045-46 (Ohio 2000); First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d
174, 185 (Wash. 1992); State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235, 241 (Wis. 1996).
30 ALA. CONST. of 1901, amend. 622 (1999), available at http://www.legislature.state.al.us/
CodeOfAlabama/Constitution/1901/CA-170364.htm (last visited Oct. 24,2004).
31 See, e.g., Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493 to 1493.01 (West 2000); Connecticut, CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571b (West Supp. 2004); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 761.01-761.05 (West Supp.
2004); Idaho, IDAHO CODE §§ 73-401 to 403 (Michie 2001); Illinois, 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/1-103
(West 2001); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-1 to -5 (Michie 2003); Oklahoma, 51 OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 51, 251 to -58 (West Supp. 2003); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-80.1 to -. 3 (1998); South Carolina,
S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-13-10 to -30 (Law. Co-op. 1999); Texas, TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 110.001
to -.012 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
32 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof .. , under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
2005]
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preempts contrary state constitutional or statutory law,33  so these state
constitutions and statutes provide no protection against incidental burdens on
religious exercise imposed by federal government action.
Finally, federal and state laws often include protection for religious activity
as part of a larger statutory or regulatory initiative aimed at a widespread and
largely secular problem. For example, the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964
generally includes religion among the prohibited bases of discrimination in
employment, 34 public education, 35 and public accommodations; 36 the Fair
Housing Act includes religion among the prohibited bases of discrimination in
housing; 37 and federal tax laws exempt qualified religious organizations from
the obligation to pay income tax as part of a general statutory exemption of
nonprofit corporations and groups. 38  Federal laws also often provide
exemptions for religious organizations or individuals from generally applicable
laws that burden religious exercise. For example, the Civil Rights Act exempts
qualified religious employers from its general prohibition on religious
discrimination when religious affiliation is a "bona fide occupational
qualification" for an employment position,39 and federal bankruptcy laws
exempt religious tithes from the so-called "preference" period during which
gifts or disproportionate creditor payments are voidable.
40
33 See infra Part I.E. (discussing priority of federal law to state law in the United States).
34 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2 (2000) (providing that it is an "unlawful employment practice" for employers,
employment agencies, labor unions, and employment training programs to discriminate on the basis of "race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin" in hiring, terminating, promoting, admitting as members, or otherwise
dealing with employees or applicants).
35 Id. § 2000c-5 (authorizing the U.S. Attorney General to bring suit against public schools that deny
admission "by reason of race, color, religion, sex or national origin").
36 Id. § 2000a(a) ("All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation.., without
discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin."); id. § 2000a-l
(providing that "[a]ll persons shall be entitled to be free, at any establishment or place, from discrimination or
segregation of any kind on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin..." which may otherwise be
required by state law).
37 Id. § 3604 (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or
national origin" in the sale or rental of housing units and in activities related thereto); id. § 3605 (prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin" by any
business providing "real estate-related transactions" services); id. § 3605(b) (same with respect to provision of
and access to real estate brokerage services and membership in real estate brokerage associations).
'8 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)(d) (2000).
3' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2000).
40 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (2000).
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D. Other Sources of Law
In the U.S. system, with its sparse constitutional text and a common law
tradition inherited from England, judicial decisions are the primary source of
law relating to permissible limitations on religious activity. I Administrative
regulations and guidelines also play an important role, especially those issued
by agencies charged with enforcement of anti-discrimination laws.42
Finally, the President may exercise a certain degree of control over the
various Cabinet departments and much of the federal bureaucracy without
consulting Congress. Presidential directives, proclamations, and other such
acts, known as "executive orders," have the force and effect of law when they
are founded upon constitutional or federal statutory authority. 43 For example,
on his own authority as chief executive of the United States, President Bush
has ordered all federal executive departments and agencies to comply with the
so-called "charitable choice" provisions, which generally permit religious
social service agencies and other religious groups to compete for federal social
welfare grants without sacrificing their religious identity. 44 Executive orders
are thus an important source of law in cases involving burdens on religious
liberty imposed by federal departments, agencies, and other executive actors.
E. Priority of Laws
At the apex of the hierarchy of laws in the United States sits the federal
Constitution, followed by federal statutes, and then regulations promulgated
under the authority of such statutes. Executive orders are difficult to place in
this hierarchy. Obviously, executive orders are subordinate to federal statutes
passed by Congress (and, therefore, to administrative regulations lawfully
promulgated thereunder) when such orders involve matters whose regulation is
within an enumerated power of Congress. When an executive order involves
an area of executive authority as to which Congress has no power, however,
the order has a status second only to the Constitution itself.
41 See discussion infra Part I.E.
42 See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1605.1-1605.3, app. A (2002)
(establishing guidelines for religious accommodation by employers).
43 DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 862 (2002);
see also discussion infra Part I.E. (discussing the place of executive orders in the hierarchy of laws in the
United States).
44 See Exec. Order No. 13,279, 67 Fed. Reg. 77141 (Dec. 12, 2002).
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The difficulty is that it is not always clear how the Constitution has
allocated authority over a particular area, and institutional and political
considerations will often prevent judicial resolution of conflicts over whether a
particular branch is properly exercising constitutional authority. The result can
be a kind of separation-of-powers "limbo," in which both Congress and the
President make competing claims to authority over a particular matter without
ever moving to judicial resolution of such claims.45
Another complication for the American hierarchy of laws is presented by
the common law. The conception of the common law as a unified body of law
with an existence and content independent of the judges who "make" it arose
during the development of the common law as a check on royal power in early
modem England.4 6  Unlike the medievalists, however, who were generally
45 An excellent example of this phenomenon is the question to which federal branch the Constitution
allocates the power to commit the federal armed forces to combat. Although the Constitution delegates to
Congress the powers to provide for the national defense, to declare war, and to organize a federal militia, see
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cis. 1, l1 & 16, it also designates the President as the "Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States," and of such portion of the state militia as might be called into federal
service. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-6, at 662-63
(3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter TRIBE 2000] ("[A]lthough the Constitution expressly assigns to Congress the power
to 'declare war,' and expressly designates the President as Commander in Chief to direct the armed forces
during war, the Constitution neither enumerates nor vests in either branch the overarching power to 'make
war.').
Toward the end of the controversial American military involvement in Vietnam, Congress enacted
over President Nixon's veto the War Powers Resolution of 1973, Pub. L. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555, which
purported to place various limits on the President's ability to commit the federal armed forces to combat
without congressional consent. TRIBE 2000, supra, §§ 4-6, at 667-68. Subsequent presidents have denied the
power of Congress to limit the President's power in this manner while nevertheless generally complying with
the spirit of the Act's provisions, and no Congress has seen fit to challenge in court or otherwise presidential
action in this area. Cf id. § 4-6, at 668 (noting that no President has ever agreed to abide by the War Powers
Resolution, and that Congress has never taken any steps to enforce it). Similar tensions between the President
and Congress are evident in the detention cases arising out of the Iraq War. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.
Ct. 2633 (2004) (holding that Congress' "resolution authorizing the President to 'use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks' or 'harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any
future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons");
Pub. L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (authorizing the President to detain enemy combatants for the duration of
the present conflict, but providing that due process requires that the detainee be provided some opportunity to
contest before a neutral decisionmaker the factual predicate for his detention); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686
(2004) (holding that the federal courts have statutory habeas corpus jurisdiction to review detentions of aliens
held by the President at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba). Consequently, the question who has the ultimate authority
to "make war" under the Constitution remains unresolved. See TRIBE 2000, supra, §§ 4-6, at 667-68
46 GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 4 (1986) ("Against the spreading
ideology of political absolutism and rationalism, Common Law theory reasserted the medieval idea that law is
not something made either by king, Parliament, or judges, but rather is the expression of a deeper reality which
is merely discovered and publicly declared by them.").
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committed to a universal "natural" law accessible by reason and instinct, the
early modem common lawyers who succeeded them understood the
independence of the common law as the consequence of its identification with
"historically evidenced national custom."47  Moreover, the early common
lawyers understood reason and custom to stand within the common law rather
than outside of it; reason and custom, in other words, were not thought of as
external means of deriving the common law, but rather were the common
48law. Common law judges, then, did not "make" the common law with their
decisions, but merely gave it expression, and common law decisions were "not
exercises of power but merely reports of discoveries of an already existing
prescriptive order. '49 It was this view of the common law as "general"-that
is, conceptually unified and existentially independent of judges-that governed
its use by federal judges prior to Erie.50
Common law is not fully present in the federal hierarchy, because in 1938
the Supreme Court formally abrogated so-called "general" common law
47 ld.; see also id. at 45 (the classical common law was "a form of social order manifested in the practice
and common life of the nation."); NORMAN DOE, FUNDAMENTAL AUTHORITY IN LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLISH
LAW 130 (1990) ("Certainly the late medieval lawyer turned to established practice.... Yet, in addition, the
medieval lawyer habitually turned to the more fundamental authority of reason as a determinant in disposing
of ordinary cases.").
48 Brian Simpson, Common Law and Legal Theory, in LEGAL THEORY AND COMMON LAW 20 (William
Twining ed., 1986) (describing the common law as "a body of practices observed and ideas received over time
by a caste of lawyers, these ideas being used by them as providing guidance in what is conceived to be the
rational determination of disputes litigated before them .... " and further observing that such ideas, while
constituting "customary law," are customary in a more specific sense than this term normally conveys, in that
"their status is thought to be dependent upon conformity with the past, and they are traditional in the sense that
they are transmitted through time as a received body of knowledge and learning."); see also Michel Rosenfeld,
The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1307, 1337 (2001) ("In
its purest form .... the common law is a case-by-case judge-made law that evolves through elaboration of
precedents by means of a process of accretion, driven by a logic of induction.").
49 POSTEMA, supra note 46, at 16; see also id. at 7 ("Common Law is seen to be the expression or
manifestation of commonly shared values and conceptions of reasonableness and the common good."); id. at 9
("'he office of the judge is not to make, but publicly to expound and declare, the law .... Judicial opinions,
expounding and declaring the law, then, are not themselves law but only the 'principal and most authoritative
evidence, that can be given, of the existence of such a custom as shall form a part of the common law."')
(quoting Blackstone).
50 See ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-System: The Role of United States Federal
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 10
(1997) [hereinafter SCALIA, Common-Law Courts] (observing that during the late eighteenth century "the
prevailing image of the common law was that of a preexisting board of rules, uniform throughout the nation
(rather than different from state to state), that judges merely 'discovered' rather than created"); e.g., JOHN
MAXCY ZANE, THE STORY OF LAW 201 (2d ed., Liberty 1998) (1927) (noting with approval that federal courts
"refuse to recognize a rule of state law where it conflicts with a general law considered to be better or more
just.").
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adjudication by federal judges in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.51  Erie
recognized that state courts no longer look to a unified and independent body
of customary law in making common law decisions; rather, the courts of each
state now develop their own common law, which may differ substantially from
the common law of some or even all of the other states. 52 Accordingly, when a
federal court has a case before it which requires articulation of a common law
rule, the court follows and applies the common law of the applicable state
jurisdiction.
State law follows a hierarchy similar to the federal one, with state
constitutions at the top, followed by state statutes, state regulations
promulgated pursuant to the authority of such statutes, state common law, and
executive orders issued by governors. State executive orders present the same
theoretical difficulties as federal executive orders. However, because state
constitutions tend to be more detailed and easier to amend than the federal
Constitution, separation of powers ambiguities relating to state executive
orders tend to be less common and are more frequently resolved by litigation in
the courts.
The classical understanding of the common law as unified and independent
implied that even legislative enactments were not necessarily binding on
common law judges, to the extent that such enactments contradicted or
otherwise failed to reflect the immanent reason and custom of the common
law.53 "Parliament is capable of making new regulations," in other words,
"but not new law . . . . 54 Once the idea of general common law was
5' 304 U.S. 64, 80 (1938) (overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1(1842)).
52 See TRIBE 2000, supra note 45, § 3-23, at 470. Professor Tribe cautions that Erie only abrogated the
idea of general common law adjudication by federal judges-that is, the reliance by federal judges on a
customary law common to the federal government and all of the states. Id. Erie did not abrogate federal
judicial power to make common law in so called "federal legal enclaves," such as boundary and other disputes
among the states or cases involving the property rights of Native Americans, where a federal rule of decision is
required to protect federal interests. See id. at 474-76.
53 POSTEMA, supra note 46, at 25-27 (recounting the early modem view that, like judicial decisions,
enacted law "become law by eventually becoming custom .... [S]tatutes... make no impact on the law until
they are taken up into the practice of the courts and the community. Thus .... whether or not legislated legal
innovations actually have the effect of altering the shape and direction of the law is something that can be
determined only by seeing whether the enacted changes are incorporated into the body of Common Law, and
that is a process of trial by practice and is not the direct effect of enactment.") (emphasis omitted); see also id.
at 16 (summarizing Blackstone's position that "enacted law" threatened liberty in a way that judicial decisions
did not because the former constituted an act of unconstrained power and will, whereas the latter were
bounded by the "artificial reason" of the common law, which was itself "an already existing prescriptive
order") (emphasis omitted).
54 Id. at 26.
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abandoned, however, state statutes acquired a status prior to common law in
the hierarchy of laws. State courts no longer subordinate statutory to common
law; to the contrary, the common law in each state is generally subject to state
legislative control, and in general any common law rule may be repealed or
amended by state statute unless protected by the state constitution.
Neither the abandonment of general common law adjudication by federal
judges nor the formal subordination of state common law to state legislative
action should mislead one into thinking that judicial decisions are relatively
unimportant in the American legal hierarchy. Marbury v. Madison55 initiated a
long tradition of judicial supremacy in determining the meaning, scope, and
applicability of federal and state laws, be they constitutional, statutory, or
regulatory. 56  As a result, a federal decision interpreting the meaning of the
Constitution has virtually the same status in the hierarchy of laws as the
Constitution itself, and a state court decision declaring the meaning of a state
statute the same status as the statute it interprets. In case of constitutional
decisions, the decisions of the federal judiciary as to constitutional meaning are
final,57 as Boerne emphatically reaffirmed,5 8 and can be altered only by the
difficult and rarely successful route of constitutional amendment. 59  Even in
55 See, e.g., Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 177 ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound
and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.").
56 Id.
57 See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (Marbury "declared the basic principle that the
federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since
been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional
system. It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in [Brown v.
Board of Education] is the supreme law of the land, and Art[icle] VI of the Constitution makes it of binding
effect on the States 'any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."')
(quoting the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).
58 See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 556 (1997). The Court in Boerne noted:
When the [Supreme] Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the province of
the Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law is. Marbury v. Madison, 1
Cranch, at 177, 2 L.Ed. 60. When the political branches of the Government act against the
background of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must be understood
that in later cases and controversies the Court will treat its precedents with the respect due them
under settled principles, including stare decisis, and contrary expectations must be disappointed.
Id; see also Michael W. McConnell, Comment, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boeme v.
Flores, Ill HARV. L. REV. 153, 163 (1997) (characterizing Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Boerne as
having adopted a "startlingly strong view of judicial supremacy" in relation to the separations of powers, and
"the most judge-centered view of constitutional law since Cooper v. Aaron").
59 Amendment of the Constitution requires passage by a two-thirds majority in each house of Congress
and ratification by three-fourths of the states or, alternatively, action by a constitutional convention be called
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case of statutes, regulations, or executive orders, where an apparent judicial
error in interpretation may in theory be corrected by reenactment,
repromulgation, or reissue by the applicable government actor, collective
action problems, political considerations, and bureaucratic inertia will often
prevent the overturning of judicial interpretations of federal and state laws with
which another branch of the government disagrees.
It would not be an exaggeration, therefore, to place at the apex of both the
federal and state hierarchies in the United States judicial decisions declaring
the meaning of the various laws that fall under them, including the federal and
state constitutions.
II. IDENTIFICATION OF THE TYPES OF MANIFESTATION OF RELIGION THAT
GIVE RISE TO LEGAL ISSUES
The Supreme Court has long relied on a "belief-action" distinction to
delineate those manifestations of religion that are subject to regulation from
those that are insulated from it. As the Court stated in Cantwell v.
Connecticut,60 the Free Exercise Clause "embraces two concepts,-freedom to
believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but in the nature of things, the
second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of
society. ' '6  "Belief' has been held to include mere written or verbal
affirmations or other manifestations of what one does (or does not) believe, 62
but has not been extended to worship, ritual, marriage practices, and other such
activities that affect more directly the interests of others. Thus, believers are
excused from pledging allegiance to the flag of the United States when to do so
would violate their religious beliefs,63 but believers who practice polygamy or
ritual drug use in violation of the criminal law remain subject to the law
notwithstanding the religious character of their actions or their religious
motivation for engaging in them.
64
by two-thirds of the states. U.S. CONST. art. V. Since ratification of the first ten amendments constituting the
Bill of Rights in 1791, the Constitution has been successfully amended only seventeen times.
60 310U.S.296(1940)
61 Id. at 303-04; see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (stating that under the First
Amendment, "Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach
actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order.").
62 E.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977).
63 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 629-42 (1943) (holding that Speech Clause
prevents public schools from requiring Jehovah's Witness students to salute flags in violation of their beliefs).
64 See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (practitioners of peyote rites of the
Native American Church held not entitled to free exercise exemption from state anti-drug laws); Reynolds v.
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III. STRUCTURAL LIMITATIONS ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION
A. Establishment Clause Separation
The founders believed that individual liberty was most directly threatened
by the national government. Accordingly, they provided structural rather than
substantive limitations on that government. 65  A structural restraint describes
domains within which the government may not exercise its power, whereas a
right defines individual interests which the government may not violate. 66 The
text of the Religion Clauses reflects this design. Instead of defining individual
conduct that enjoys immunity from acts of Congress-such as, for example,
"the right of the people to freedom of religious conscience 67-or specifying
procedural or relative limits on congressional acts-such as, for example, "the
right of the people to freedom of religious conscience shall not be infringed,
except in case of manifest danger to the state"68-the framers drafted the
Religion Clauses to define certain religious subject matters as to which
Congress was disabled from acting at all.69
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878) (Mormon polygamist held not entitled to free exercise exemption
from federal anti-bigamy law).
65 See TRIBE 2000, supra note 45, § 1-3, at 7 ("At the outset, only a small number of explicit substantive
limitations on the exercise of governmental authority were thought essential; in the main, it was believed that
personal freedom could be secured more effectively by decentralization than by express command.").
66 See Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84
IOWA L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1998) ("For government to avoid violating a right is a matter of constitutional duty owed
to each individual within its jurisdiction. On the other hand, for government to avoid exceeding a structural
restraint is a matter of limiting its activities and laws to the scope of its powers.").
67 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that a person shall not be "compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself'), and id. amend. VI (providing that in "all criminal prosecutions," the
defendant has the right "to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence"), with id. amend. VI (guaranteeing the right to "trial by jury" in most
common law actions).
68 Compare id. amend. IV (prohibiting "unreasonable" searches and seizures, and providing that search
warrants shall issue only upon a showing of "probable cause"), and id. amend VI (providing the right to a
"speedy and public" trial in any criminal case), with id. amend. VIII (prohibiting imposition of "excessive"
bail and fines and "cruel and unusual" punishments, in criminal cases).
69 Id. amend I (prohibiting Congress from making any law "respecting an establishment of religion" or
"prohibiting the free exercise" of religion); see Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties with the First Amendment:
Congress, Section 5, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1539, 1556 (1995).
The First Amendment is a subject-matter disability, as opposed to a procedural disability.
Instead of qualifying the conduct of governmental affairs, it puts a category of laws beyond the
competence of Congress. The disability is so complete that Congress is expressly forbidden to
enact laws respecting an establishment of religion, or laws abridging the free exercise of religion,
freedom of speech and press, and the right to petition the government.
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One of the lessons of the long conflict over slavery in the United States was
that the states could be as great a threat to individual liberty as the national
government, and accordingly that structural restraint of the national
government was insufficient to protect the rights and liberties of Americans.7 °
Accordingly, the aftermath of the North's victory in the Civil War saw
ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments, which prohibited the states
from abridging the "privileges or immunities of citizens," depriving any person
of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," and denying their
residents the "equal protection of the laws," 7' and granted to Congress the
72
affirmative power to enforce these rights. These clauses provided the textual
basis for a dramatic expansion of constitutional rights and liberties through
both judicial and congressional action. This expansion eventually included the
application of most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, including both of the
Religion Clauses, against the states,73 and the re-interpretation of the Religion
Clauses and the First Amendment generally as articulating individual rights to
Id.; Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REV. 477, 481-82 (1991)
("[T]he historical record is clear that when the religion language [of the First Amendment) was first adopted it
was designed to restrain the federal government from interfering with the variety of state-church arrangements
then in place."); see also Esbeck, supra note 64, at 14-18 (observing that the Establishment Clause was
originally understood as a "dual restraint on national sovereignty" which prevented the national government
from legislating with respect to established churches in the individual states and from setting up a national or
other church ordained by national law); Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause,
77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 413, 415 (2002) (arguing that the framers understood the Establishment Clause as a
"guarantor of a negative liberty right" aimed at preventing "coercion of conscience by prohibiting a range of
government activities greater than the set of actions that directly coerce conscience").
70 See TRIBE 2000, supra note 45, § 7-1, at 1295 (The Civil War and the Reconstruction Amendments
placed the "issue of personal rights-and the necessity of their direct protection against state interference-
squarely within the cognizance of the federal Constitution and the federal judiciary."); see also AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 128-36, 143 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1989).
71 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
72 Id., § 5.
73 Though well-entrenched, incorporation of the Establishment Clause against the states continues to
draw academic criticism. See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 66, at 26 ("Ignoring federalism in the [Establishment]
Clause was an act of sheer judicial will which is still debated by academicians today."); Note, Rethinking the
Incorporation of the Establishment Clause: A Federalist View, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1700, 1709-12 (1992)
(arguing that because the Establishment Clause is a structural limitation on Congress enacted to preserve state
regulatory control over religion against federal encroachment, its incorporation against the states was
incoherent). See generally Bybee, supra note 69, at 1608-09 (arguing that as a structural provision designed
to protect the states against Congressional interference, "the entire First Amendment [is] a poor candidate for
any textually rigorous theory of incorporation"). Justice Brennan authored the classic defense of incorporation
of the Establishment Clause in Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 256 (1963) (concurring opinion). Though
he agrees that the Establishment Clause was originally a structural provision, Professor Feldman has recently
argued that it was designed as a protection of individual religious liberty and not as a federalist barrier
protecting the religious prerogatives of the states. See Feldman, supra note 69, at 405-12.
[Vol. 19
THE UNITED STATES
be protected against both federal and state government, and not mere structural
restraints on the federal government alone.
The structural antecedents of the Religion Clauses are evident in
contemporary Establishment Clause doctrine. This doctrine presupposes that
the Clause protects two values: the separation of government and religion, and
government neutrality among particular religions and between religion and
non-religion. Separation requires that religion and government refrain from
involving themselves in the affairs of the other. In Everson v. Board of
74Education, for example, the Court declared that government cannot "set up a
church," or "adopt... teach or practice religion. 75  It also stated that
"[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can ... participate in the affairs
of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. ' ' 76 Separation seeks to
ensure that government and religion each operate freely in their own separate
spheres, uninhibited by regulation or interference by the other.
77
Neutrality requires that government regulate its interactions with religious
individuals and institutions so that it neither encourages nor discourages
religious beliefs or practices. In Epperson v. Arkansas,78 for example, the
Court stated that
government in our democracy, state and national, must be neutral in
matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice. It may not be
hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of no-religion; and it may
not aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious theory against
another or even against the militant opposite. The First Amendment
mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and
between religion and non-religion.
79
74 330 U.S. at 15-16.
75 id.
76 Id. at 16.
77 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-3, at 1161 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter
TRIBE 1988]; see also Carl H. Esbeck, Myths, Miscues, and Misconceptions: No-Aid Separationist and the
Establishment Clause, 13 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 285, 292 (1999) ("[Tlhe most fundamental
aim of church/state separation... is to keep these two centers of authority-God and Caesar, so to speak-
within their respective spheres of competence.").
7' 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968).
79 Id.; see also Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16 (Neither the federal government nor any state "can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a
person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in
any religion.").
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Neutrality seeks to ensure that the degree of acceptance enjoyed by any
particular religion is the result of the free and independent choices of its
members, undistorted by government coercion or influence.
80
Establishment Clause neutrality functions like an equality right under the
Equal Protection Clause, except that the Establishment Clause generally
applies to protect religious institutions as well as religious individuals from
anti-religious discrimination. Consequently, laws and programs that violate
the neutrality value by excluding or penalizing religious individuals or
institutions can usually remedy this defect by lifting the religious penalty or
including the excluded religious individuals or institutions within the disputed
program. Separation, however, remains a structural limitation. Unlike most of
the other provisions of the Bill of Rights, in its separationist mode the
Establishment Clause functions as a structural limitation on government
power, defining a set of acts in which government may not engage. 8' The
constitutional problem with government action that offends Establishment
Clause separation is not that an individual or institutional interest has been
violated; rather, the problem is that the government has crossed a subject-
matter boundary set by the Establishment Clause. Consequently, separation
violations cannot be cured by removing religious discrimination or balancing
the violation of a right by appeal to weighty government interests, for no
matter how the law or program is reformulated or weighted, it will still
represent the government's violation of an absolute limit on religious subject
matters as to which the government is prohibited from dealing.
Over the last generation or so, neutrality has eclipsed separation as the
dominant Establishment Clause value. Most of the disabilities formerly
80 See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952) ("We sponsor an attitude on the part of
government that shows no partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish according to the zeal of its
adherents and the appeal of its dogma.... The government must be neutral when it comes to competition
between sects."); see also TRIBE 1988, supra note 77, § 14-3, at 1160-61 ("The establishment clause... can
be understood as designed in part to assure that the advancement of a church would come only from the
voluntary support of its followers and not from the political support of the state. Religious groups, it was
believed, should prosper or perish on the intrinsic merit of their beliefs and practices."); Donald A. Giannella,
Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part 11. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81
HARV. L. REV. 513, 587 (1968) (Religious neutrality ensures that "the capacity of religious ideas to shape our
culture depends on society's free and informed response to them rather than on the failure of the state to grant
them equality of treatment with competing ideas.").
81 See Esbeck, supra note 66, at 21 ("[Flrom its inception the Establishment Clause-whatever the
intended scope of its national-level restraint-had the role of a structural clause rather than a rights-based
clause."); Note, Rethinking the Incorporation of the Establishing Clause: A Federalist View supra note 73, at
1710 ("[Mlany scholars have suggested that the Establishment Clause is not a provision of individual liberty at
all. Rather, it is a structural limitation upon federal power and a reservation of authority to the states.").
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imposed on religious activity by Establishment Clause separation have been
removed by the application of neutrality. 82 Nevertheless, there remain at least
four areas where separation continues to control constitutional matters:
Government may not delegate its authority to churches and other religious
83. 84.institutions, it may not sponsor or participate in religious worship, it cannot
enact essentially theological precepts into law, 85 and it cannot make theological
judgments or interfere in the internal governance of a church or other religious
institution. 86  Most of these situations are not ones that can be dealt with
coherently by neutrality; it is a conceptual impossibility, for example, for
government to sponsor religious worship in a manner that does not favor one
denomination or sect over another, or religion generally over secular ideologies
and moralities. But even if neutrality were useful in such situations, it would
run into separation as an inflexible and irreducible definition of domains that
the government cannot enter, regardless of the "neutrality" of the intervention.
Government activity in these areas violates the Establishment Clause no matter
how it is structured, because separation is a limitation on government
involvement in the prohibited domains.
82 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 253 (1997). Under the rubric of "neutrality," Supreme Court
decisions since 1981 have removed Establishment Clause obstacles to the use of public forums and the receipt
of government aid by religious groups and individuals. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652-54
(2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234-35, 236 (1997);
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384
(1993); Zobrest v. Catalina Hills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 402 (1983);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). For an account of the foregoing developments, see Frederick Mark
Gedicks, Neutrality in Establishment Clause Interpretation: Its Past and Future, in CHURCH-STATE
RELATIONS IN CRISIS: DEBATING NEUTRALITY 191 (Stephen V. Monsma ed., 2002).
83 See Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687,709-10 (1994) (invalidating special school district drawn to
coincide with boundaries of orthodox Jewish community); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 127
(1982) (invalidating church veto power over liquor licenses granted to bars and restaurants located in the
vicinity).
84 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 61 (1985); Sch. Dist.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226-27 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962) (invalidating public
school prayer).
85 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 596-97 (1987) (invalidating mandatory teaching of
creationism); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41-44 (1980) (invalidating mandatory display of the Ten
Commandments); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 108-09 (1968) (invalidating prohibition on teaching
evolution); People (ex. rel. McCollum) v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) (prohibition of in-class
sectarian religious instruction).
86 See discussion infra Part 111..
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B. The Church Autonomy Cases
The Church Autonomy Cases87 involve disputes within a denomination
over ownership of church property or appointment to ecclesiastical office that
find their way into a secular court. The cases generally hold that a court may
not adjudicate controversies between religious claimants when doing so would
require judicial interpretation of the content or merits of a religious belief or
practice. 89 Theological questions, in other words, are not justiciable by secular
courts.90  When adjudication calls for judicial interpretation of religious
doctrine, the Church Autonomy Cases call on the court to defer to the
interpretation advanced by the denomination's internal governing structure or,
if no such interpretation is forthcoming, to abstain altogether from adjudicating
the case. 9'
The Supreme Court has never made clear whether the theoretical
justification for the rule of non-justiciability of theological disputes should be a
religious group autonomy right or a lack of judicial competence, 92 which is
why it cannot be wholly subsumed under the structural limitations of
Establishment Clause separation. 93  The importance of establishing the
theoretical foundation for the rule, however, was eclipsed by a serious
87 Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Presbyterian Church v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344
U.S. 94 (1952); Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 679 (1871). Watson was a pre-Erie diversity case decided under federal common law, but its holding
and rationale were constitutionalized by Kedroff. See Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 115-16.
88 See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S at 696; Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 440;
Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 94; Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at I ;Watson, 80 U.S at 679.
89 See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 708-09; Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 449;
see also Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595,603 (1979).
90 See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 17.12, at 1322 (5th ed. 1995)
("Courts can never question a church's rulings on matters of religious doctrine."); TRIBE 1988, supra note 77,
§ 14-11, at 1232 ("[Llaw in a nontheocratic state cannot measure religious truth.... [lit is now settled that the
resolution of religious questions can play no role in the civil adjudication of such disputes--that ecclesiastical
doctrines cannot be used to measure right or wrong under civil law.").
91 Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 709-10; Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 449-51;
Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 16; Watson, 80 U.S. at 727, 733.
92 A number of commentators have made the rights-based argument. See, e.g., Ronald R. Garet,
Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001 (1983); Frederick Mark Gedicks,
Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, Wis. L. REV. 99 (1989); Douglas Laycock,
Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to
Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981). More recently, Professor Esbeck has made the
competence argument. See Esbeck, supra note 64, at 42-59 (arguing that the Establishment Clause deprives
federal and state courts of subject matter jurisdiction over intra-church disputes that depend on the resolution
of religious questions).
93 See discussion supra Part IlI.A.
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qualification to the rule. In 1979, the Supreme Court held in Jones v. Wolf 94
that a secular court may properly adjudicate internal denominational disputes if
it does so by reference to "neutral legal principles"-that is, without resort to
interpreting religious doctrine or theology. In that event, the court is
permitted to take into account interpretations of religious doctrine rendered by
the denomination's internal governing structure, but it is not required to do
SO. 96  Since Employment Division v. Smith,97 some courts have understood
"neutral, general laws" from that decision as being synonymous with "neutral
legal principles" in Jones,98 thereby expanding the neutral principles exception
to apply to virtually any secular law that does not facially classify on the basis
of religion.
99
When read with Smith, the neutral principles exception of Jones seriously
undercuts the structural limitation on government intervention that the Church
Autonomy Cases once afforded to religious groups. After all, when neutral
legal principles suggest how a denominational dispute should be decided, the
independence and autonomy of the church is irrelevant, and a court may
proceed to resolve the dispute in accordance with such principles even if the
resolution ignores or contradicts the result indicated by the church's own
94 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
95 Id. at 604.
96 Id. at 605 (rejecting a rule of "compulsory deference").
97 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
98 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
99 See, e.g., Sanders v. Baucum, 929 F. Supp. 1028, 1034 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (holding that laws found to
be religiously neutral and generally applicable under Smith and Lukumi "can be applied to resolve even
internal disputes within a church without offending the First Amendment"); Smith v. O'Connell, 986 F. Supp.
73, 79-80 (D.R.I. 1997) (implicitly equating "neutral laws of general application" under Smith with the
"neutral-principles approach" of Jones); In re Newman, 203 B.R. 468, 475 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1996) (holding
that statute invalidating debtor preferences is "a valid and neutral law of general application" whose
application to tithes rested on "neutral principles of law" which did not entangle the court in religious
questions); Rashedi v. Gen. Bd. of Church of Nazarene, 54 P.3d 349, 353-54 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (holding
that whether church was negligent in the employment and assignment of sexually abusive pastor could not be
adjudicated under the "neutral principles" exception of Jones because judgment required was excessively
subjective and thus not "neutral" within the meaning of Smith); Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n,
913 P.2d 909, 933 & n.1 (Cal. 1996) (finding that Jones and Smith were both about judicial incompetence to
adjudicate theological questions); Prince v. Firman, 584 A.2d 8, 12-13 (D.C. 1990) (holding that because a
statute is constitutional under Smith, it constitutes a "neutral property disposition rule" that does not entangle
the court in an interpretation of religious doctrine); Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1149 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1990) (citing both Jones and Smith for the proposition that "secular courts must confine their analysis to the
secular law, and leave the implications of religious law, rules, or customs to the internal tribunals of the
various religious groups which recognize such rules").
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governing structure.100 This means that the Church Autonomy Cases provide
no obstacle to a court that wishes to intervene in a denominational dispute, so
long as the court can identify (as it nearly always can) a secular law whose
application to the dispute would resolve it without resort to interpretation of
religious doctrine. In other words, Jones and Smith largely remove the
structural limitation on government intrusion on religious group autonomy
represented by the Church Autonomy Cases.
C. State Blaine Amendments
Named after James G. Blaine, a xenophobic member of the U.S. Congress
who served in the House of Representatives and the Senate from 1863 to
1881,101 the Blaine Amendments are modeled after a federal constitutional
amendment that Blaine introduced in the House in 1876.102 This proposed
amendment would have applied the Religion Clauses to the states and
prohibited them from allocating state funds and other resources to "sectarian"
organizations, particularly religious elementary and secondary schools, 1°3 and
is generally thought to have been motivated by nativist fear of immigrants,
especially Roman Catholics. Although Congress never passed the federal
Blaine Amendment, most of the states enacted similar provisions as part of
their constitutions; thirty-seven of these are still on the books.
The Blaine Amendments generally prohibit state aid to "religious" or
"sectarian" institutions, using language that is usually more specific and
100 This is precisely what the Jones dissenters maintained would be the consequence of rejecting
compulsory deference. See 443 U.S. at 611-14 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., White, & Stewart, JJ.,
dissenting).
For a comprehensive discussion of the Church Autonomy Cases, see Symposium, Church Autonomy
and the Free Exercise of Religion, 2004 BYU L. Rev. 1093; 2004 BYU L. Rev. 1633.
101 See Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Text of the Federal Blaine Amendment, available at
http://www.blaineamendments.orglntro/BAtext-US.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2004) [hereinafter Blaine
Amendment]
102 id.
103 The Blaine Amendment provided:
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any State for the support of public schools,
or derived from any public fund therefor[e], nor any public lands devoted thereto, shall ever be
under the control of any religious sect; nor shall any money so raised or lands so devoted be
divided between religious sects or denominations.
See Blaine Amendment, supra note 101.
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prohibitive than the federal Establishment Clause.'0 The Blaine Amendments
are thus a structural limitation imposed by state constitutions on the extent to
which state governments can assist private religious schools and other religious
organizations, even under the auspices of a religiously neutral aid program. At
one time, there was serious doubt about their constitutionality.' 0 5  As I have
indicated, laws that single out a particular religion for disadvantageous
treatment are presumptively invalid under the Equal Protection, Establishment,
and Free Exercise Clauses.10 6 Accordingly, if "sectarian" in the Amendments
is read as code for "Roman Catholic," as history suggests it was so understood
in the nineteenth century, 1°7 then state Blaine Amendments that use this term
can plausibly be characterized as engaging in denominational discrimination in
violation of both Religion Clauses and the Equal Protection Clause.'0 8 Those
Amendments that ban aid to "religious" rather than "sectarian" schools would
be similarly infirm under Supreme Court statements that discrimination against
generic or general "religion" is prohibited by the Equal Protection and Free
Exercise Clauses. Finally, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
104 See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 3 ("No revenue of the state or any political subdivision or agency
thereof shall ever be taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect, or religious
denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution."); MASS. CONST. art. XVIII ("[Public moneys] shall never
be appropriated to any religious sect for the maintenance exclusively of its own schools."); NEV. CONST. art.
11, § 10 ("No public funds of any kind or character whatever, State, County or Municipal, shall be used for
sectarian purposes."); UTAH CONST. art. X, § 9 ("Neither the state of Utah nor its political subdivisions may
make any appropriation for the direct support of any school or educational institution controlled by any
religious organization."); WASH. CONST. art. I, § II ("No public money or property shall be appropriated for or
applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment .... ").
105 For a careful examination of equal protection, establishment, free exercise, and illicit motivation
arguments which contend that the Blaine Amendments are unconstitutional, see Ira C. Lupu & Robert W.
Tuttle, Zelman's Future: Vouchers, Sectarian Providers, and the Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 917 (2003) [hereinafter Lupu & Tuttle, Zelman's Future]. See also Symposium,
Separation of Church and States, 2 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. (2003).
106 See discussion supra Part lU.B.
107 See, e.g., Richard A. Baer, Jr., The Supreme Court's Discriminatory Use of the Term "Sectarian", 6
J.L. & POL. 449 (1990); see also Jay S. Bybee & David W. Newton, Of Orphans and Vouchers: Nevada's
"Little Blaine Amendment" and the Future of Religious Participation in Public Programs, 2 NEV. L.J. 551,
551 (2002) (observing that President Grant's references to "demagogue," "priestcraft," and "religious sect" in
his last annual message to Congress were clearly directed at the growing Roman Catholic influence on public
education). Four Justices of the Supreme Court recently drew attention to the anti-Catholic connotations of
"sectarian." See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828-29 (2001) (plurality opinion of Thomas, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, & Kennedy, JJ.).
108 Of course, it is not a foregone conclusion that a majority of the Court will read "sectarian" historically.
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denominationally neutral prohibitions on tangible aid to religious organizations
and individuals violate the Establishment Clause.'
°9
The Supreme Court resolved many of these questions in Locke v. Davey
when it held that the states may adopt state constitutional provisions that are
more separationist and more restrictive of religion than the federal
Establishment Clause.' 10  Moreover, the continuing influence of separationist
sentiment in some states is likely to result in secular conditions being imposed
on receipt of state aid which many religious schools and organizations would
be reluctant to accept, regardless of how broadly or narrowly Locke's holding
is applied by the lower courts. Thus, in addition to the more restrictive state
establishment clause provisions apparently approved by Locke, even-handed
secular conditions imposed upon secularly defined beneficiary groups in a
government aid program are also likely to exclude many religious individuals,
schools, and organizations from participating in such programs.Ill
IV. IDENTIFICATION OF GROUNDS THAT HAVE BEEN RECOGNIZED FOR
LIMITING FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF
Given that freedom of religion in the United States is now much more of an
equality right than a liberty right,112 it is perhaps more appropriate to identify
the sole ground that does not justify a governmental burden on religious
liberty-religious animus. Government action that targets religion or a
religious group for regulatory action, while excluding secular and other
religious groups that are similarly situated with respect to the regulatory
purpose, violates the Equal Protection, Establishment, and Free Exercise
Clauses. 13 In other words, government can limit religious liberty for any
109 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 223-30 (1997); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 666 (1995); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Witters v. Wash.
Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 485-90 (1986).
Restrictions on "religious" schools might also violate the Equal Protection Clause as covert
discrimination against Roman Catholics, since denominationally neutral Blaine Amendment prohibitions on
aid to religious schools disproportionately impact the extensive Roman Catholic parochial school system, and
were originally motivated by religious hostility towards Roman Catholics. Cf. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
110 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
111 See Frederick Mark Gedicks, Reconstructing the Blaine Amendments, 2 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 85
(2003), available at http://papers.ssm.comsol3/papers.cfm? abstractid--419221 (last visited Nov. 2, 2004).
112 See discussion infra Part VI.A.
113 See discussion supra Part II.B.
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reason other than the desire to harm a particular religion or religion generally.
So long as the burden imposed by government action on religious activity is
shared by secular and religious groups in the same regulatory situation, the
Constitution is satisfied.
V. ANALYTICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE LAW ON LIMITATIONS OF RIGHTS
The doctrine of limitations on the right of religious liberty under the U.S.
Constitution can be succinctly stated in three rules:
(1) The General Rule of Deferential Review. Religiously neutral and
generally applicable laws that incidentally burden religious exercise
are subject to minimal judicial scrutiny under the Free Exercise
Clause; laws lacking either religious neutrality or general
applicability are subject to heightened judicial scrutiny."
(2) Exceptions Calling for Strict Review. Notwithstanding the
General Rule, religiously neutral and generally applicable laws that
incidentally burden religious exercise are subject to heightened
judicial scrutiny if (a) such laws burden constitutional rights in
addition to the free exercise of religion (the Hybrid Rights
Exception); or (b) such laws provide for exemptions based on
individual circumstances, but do not permit exemptions for religious
hardship (the Individualized Assessment Exception)." 5
(3) The Rule of Permissive Accommodation. Although under the
General Rule judges lack authority to mandate religious exemptions
from religiously neutral and generally applicable laws that
incidentally burden religious exercise, unless one of the two
Exceptions applies, Congress and the state legislatures are free to
enact such exemptions by statute. 1
16
114 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32, 546 (1993); Smith, 494
U.S. at 877-80, 882, 884-85; see also Boerne, 521 U.S. at 514 ("Smith held that neutral, generally applicable
laws may be applied to religious practices even when not supported by a compelling governmental interest.").
115 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 (discussing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)); id. at 884 (discussing
Unemployment Compensation Cases, 489 U.S. 829 (1989); 480 U.S. 136 (1987); 450 U.S. 707 (1981); 374
U.S. 398 (1963)); see also Boerne, 521 U.S. at 513-14 (noting that the only cases in which the Court had
found a neutral, generally applicable law unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause were "cases in which
other constitutional protections were at stake," and cases "where the State has in place a system of individual
exemptions" which it refused to extend to "cases of religious hardship").
116 Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (dictum):
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A. The General Rule of Deferential Review: Religious Neutrality and General
Applicability
The meaning of religious neutrality and general applicability was the
principal focus of the Court in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City
of Hialeah,' 7 decided only three years after Smith. Lukumi dealt with the
Santeria, a religious sect from the Carribean which includes among its
religious practices the ritual sacrifice of small animals." 8  The decision struck
down a series of municipal ordinances that had the purpose and effect of
prohibiting Santeria sacrifices, but virtually no other kind of animal slaughter
or killing.119
1. Religious Neutrality and Religious Discrimination
Lukumi held that a law lacks religious neutrality if its purpose is to restrict
religious practices because they are religious.' A law is neutral with respect
to religion, in other words, if it does not use religion as a basis of
classification-that is, if the religious beliefs and practices of those to whom a
law applies are irrelevant to the law's goals.' 21  Such a religiously
discriminatory purpose may be evident from the text of the law, 122 as well as
from its effect. 123  For example, the Court noted that use of words like
"sacrifice" and "ritual" in the ordinances, as well as the recital in these laws
Values that are protected against government interference through enshrinement in the Bill of
Rights are not thereby banished from the political process. Just as a society that believes in the
negative protection accorded to the press by the First Amendment is likely to enact laws that
affirmatively foster the dissemination of the printed word, so also a society that believes in the
negative protection accorded to religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of that value in
its legislation as well .... But to say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is
permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally required, and that the
appropriate occasions for its creation can be discerned by the courts.
Id.
117 508 U.S. at 520.
... Id. at 524-25.
119 Id. at 545-47.
120 Id. at 533.
121 See PHILLIP KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW: OF CHURCH AND STATE AND THE SUPREME COURT
17-18 (1962).
122 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533 ("[T]he minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on
its face. A law lacks facial neutrality if it refers to a religious practice without a secular meaning discemable
from the language or context.").
123 Id. at 534-35 ("Official action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be
shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality .... Apart from the text, the effect of a
law in its real operation is strong evidence of its object.").
[Vol. 19
THE UNITED STATES
that they were intended to prohibit religions engaging in particular practices
contrary to "public morals, peace or safety," were evidence that the text of the
ordinances was not religiously neutral. As further evidence of a lack of
religious neutrality, virtually the only conduct the ordinances prohibited were
the worship rituals of the Santeria.
124
Religious neutrality defines the purpose of the Free Exercise Clause as
preventing religious discrimination, rather than protecting freedom of action in
a domain of religious liberty. Yet, as I have indicated, constitutional doctrine
already defines religious classifications as presumptively invalid bases of
governmental classification under both the Establishment and Equal Protection
Clauses. 125 By recharacterizing the Free Exercise Clause as a mere protection
against religious discrimination, Smith left the Clause with nothing to do that is
not already done by these other two Clauses. 126 Redundancy between the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses can be reduced by assigning the problem
of discriminatory burdens on religion to the Free Exercise Clause, and the
problem of preferential assistance to or endorsement of religion to the
Establishment Clause. 127  However, this still leaves the Free Exercise and
Equal Protection Clauses almost entirely coextensive with each other. Indeed,
the Court could easily have rested its conclusion of unconstitutionality in
Lukumi entirely on the understanding that the ordinances created facial and as-
applied sectarian religious classifications in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. 128  Were religious neutrality the only analytic touchstone under the
Free Exercise Clause, one would have to conclude that Smith had effectively
read the Clause out of the Constitution.
124 id. at 535-37. For example, although the ordinances purported to regulate the unnecessary and
inhumane killing of animals, hunting and fishing for sport, using rabbits to train greyhound racing dogs, and
kosher slaughter by severance of the carotid arteries were all exempt from the prohibitions of the ordinances.
Id. at 535-37.
125 See discussion supra Part I.B.
126 See James D. Gordon I1l, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REv. 91, 113, 115 (1991)
(making this point with respect to the Establishment Clause).
127 See, e.g., Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 532 ("Our Establishment Clause cases.., for the most part have
addressed governmental efforts to benefit religion or particular religions, and so have dealt with a question
different, at least in its formulation and emphasis, from the issue here. Petitioners allege an attempt to disfavor
their religion because of the religious ceremonies it commands, and the Free Exercise Clause is dispositive in
our analysis.").
12' Cf id. at 540-42 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Stevens, J.) (using equal protection analysis to
show that the ordinances were motivated by governmental hostility towards the Santeria); see supra Part l.B.
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2. General Applicability and Legislative Underinclusion
Lukumi defined "general applicability" as an additional prohibition on
religious "targeting"-that is, a prohibition against laws that pursue their
secular objectives only against religious conduct. 129  Lukumi cited four
decisions as authority for the proposition that the general applicability of
legislation is a familiar requirement of First Amendment jurisprudence; these
citations suggest that the Court understands a generally applicable law to be
one that does not focus its burdens or benefits on a particular religious class to
the exclusion of most others that are similarly situated. 3 0
Lukumi explained that religious targeting and general applicability are
mutually reinforcing tests: a law that religiously targets is usually not generally
applicable, and vice versa. 13 1 Consider, for example, a police force grooming
standard which purports to prohibit officers from wearing beards, in order to
promote a clean-cut image and to develop esprit de corps among officers. 1
32
Assume that the police force refuses to exempt from this standard Muslim,
Sikh, and other officers who wear beards for religious reasons, but that it
routinely exempts any officer who wears a beard because he suffers from a
skin condition, wishes to keep his face warmer during the winter, portrays
129 See, e.g., id. at 524 ("The principle of general applicability was violated because the secular ends
asserted in defense of the [challenged] laws were pursued only with respect to conduct motivated by religious
beliefs."); id. at 543 ("Government, in pursuit of legitimate interests, cannot in a selective manner impose
burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief .... ); id. at 545 ("Each of Hialeah's ordinances
pursues the city's governmental interests only against conduct motivated by religious belief. The ordinances
'ha[ve] every appearance of a prohibition that society is prepared to impose upon [Santeria worshipers] but not
upon itself") (quoting and paraphrasing Florida Star v. BJ.F., 491 U.S. 524, 542 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and in the judgment)).
130 See id at 543 (citing Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1991) (holding that state
doctrine of promissory estoppel sought to be applied against a newspaper reporter is "a law of general
applicability" because "[it] does not target or single out the press," but "is generally applicable to... all the
citizens" of the state) (emphasis added)); Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189-91, 200-01 (1990) (finding
that certain amendments to Title VII constitute generally applicable laws because they "do not carve out any
special privilege" for nondisclosure of tenure files and other peer review material by colleges and universities);
Minn. Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983) (invalidating state tax
which had the effect of collecting the vast majority of its revenue from one or two newspapers, because state
had "single[d] out the press" for special treatment rather than applying the tax to all the constituents of the
taxing jurisdiction); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449
(1969) (holding that church property disputes are justiciable under the Establishment Clause when they can be
resolved by reference to "neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes," as opposed to
resolution by the particular doctrines or customs of a religious organization) (emphasis added).
"' Lukumi,508 U.S. at531.
132 See Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 366 (3d Cir.




Santa Claus in a local Christmas play, wishes to look older and more
distinguished, or, indeed, has any reason for wearing a beard other than
religious conscience.1 33  Even if the standard is somehow worded so as to
avoid targeting religious exercise by its terms, its effect is still to prevent
police officers from wearing beards only when they are worn for religious
reasons. The standard thus lacks religious neutrality because it singles out
religious conduct for a burden-a prohibition on wearing beards for religious
reasons-that is not imposed on secular conduct-beards may be worn for any
nonreligious reason.
1 34
The standard also lacks general applicability. If one assumes that most
police officers do not wear beards for religious reasons, then a grooming
standard that prohibits beards only when they are worn for religious reasons
does not apply to most of the police force. 35  A law lacking general
applicability is called "underinclusive," because "it applies to less than the
entire universe of cases that pose the problem the law seeks to solve."' 36 The
grooming standard is dramatically underinclusive, because it prohibits only a
small portion of the conduct-wearing a beard-that purportedly undermines
its image and officer-unity purposes.
Lukumi thus characterizes both religious targeting and general applicability
as tests that screen for religious discrimination.' 37  A broader reading of
general applicability is possible, however. Consider a police grooming
standard that prohibited all officer beards, except those worn for medical
reasons. 138 Such a policy might be justified on the dual grounds that those who
suffer severe skin irritations from shaving can only comply with the standard
133 See id. at 360 (noting that exemptions from no-beard policy were extended to those who needed to
wear beards for medical reasons).
134 See id. at 365 (arguing that by exempting from no-beard policy beards worn for medical reasons but
not beards worn for religious reasons, the police force unconstitutionally devalued "religious reasons for
wearing beards by judging them to be of lesser import than medical reasons.").
135 Cf. id. at 367 (noting that the Muslim plaintiffs differed from most other members of the force in
wishing to wear beards for religious reasons).
136 MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 212 (2002).
137 See 508 U.S. at 531; see also Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comn'n, 165 F.3d 692, 701-02 (9th
Cir. 1999), vacated on ripeness grounds on rehearing en banc, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000)
("Underinclusiveness is not in and of itself a talisman of constitutional infirmity; rather, it is significant only
insofar as it indicates something more sinister," such as a government goal of "suppressing religious
exercise.").
138 Shaving reportedly causes severe acne and skin irritations in some men, particularly African
Americans.
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by sacrificing their health, and that those officers availing themselves of the
exception are likely to be a relatively small percentage of the force.
Of course, those who wear beards as a matter of religious belief can make
the same arguments: those who adhere to religions that require their male
members to wear beards can only comply with the standard by abandoning this
precept of their religion, and the number of officers wearing beards for
religious reasons is likely to be a relatively small percentage of the force.
From this, one can argue that the standard lacks general applicability because it
is under inclusive with respect to its stated purposes-that is, it exempts some
beards from the standard, thereby undermining its image and moral purposes,
but refuses to exempt other beards that do not undermine these purposes to any
greater extent.
This broader reading of general applicability screens for a kind of religious
discrimination that the narrow reading does not. A standard that prohibits all
beards except those wom for medical reasons does not appear to target only
religious conduct because substantial amounts of secular conduct-beards
worn for warmth, costume, or personal preference-is prohibited along with
religious conduct-namely, beards worn for religious reasons. The standard
nevertheless discriminates against religion. Exempting secular activity from a
law but not religious activity reflects a legislative judgment that nonexempt
religious activity is less important than the exempted secular activity. 139 Put
another way, the exemption reflects an implicit judgment that religious
exercise is a less important personal interest than maintaining a clear
complexion. Yet, religious activity is a "constitutionally preferred" liberty
under the express protection of the Free Exercise Clause, whereas most secular
activity merely reflects interests of no special constitutional significance.
140
By exempting from the standard beards worn for medical reasons, but not
beards worn for religious reasons, the grooming standard elevates the right to
proper treatment of a medical condition, which is nowhere guaranteed by the
U.S. Constitution, over the right to the free exercise of one's religion, which is.
139 Eugene Volokh, A Common Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465, 1541
(1999). Because he maintains that judgments about the extent to which religious activities are comparable to
exempted secular activities are better made by legislatures than courts, Professor Volokh argues that laws
which favor secular activities over apparently similar religious activities by exempting the former but not the
latter, are "perfectly proper." Id. at 1540-41.
140 Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 51; but see Note, Neutral
Rules of General Applicability: Incidental Burdens on Religion, Speech, and Property, 115 HARV. L. REV.
1713 (2002) [hereinafter Note, Neutral Rules] (arguing that the Supreme Court now provides greater
constitutional protection to private property rights than to free exercise rights).
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Some commentators have argued that this broader reading of general
applicability requires strict scrutiny of any law that provides for any secular
exemption, but no religious exemptions. 141  This is an over-reading of both
Smith and Lukumi. Although there are hints in both opinions that the Court
might be prepared to expand the meaning of general applicability in a proper
case, 142 requiring that the government provide religious exemptions whenever
a law allows any exemption for secular conduct would be to create an
exception to the General Rule that swallows it up.143
A more realistic reading of Smith and Lukumi would require the
government to show that exempted secular conduct has a different relationship
to the purpose of the law than nonexempted religious conduct. 144  In other
words, a religious exemption is required only when nonexempt religious
conduct presents no greater threat to a law's purpose than already exempt
secular conduct. 145 To return yet again to the police officer grooming standard,
141 See, e.g., Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith, Lukumi, and the
General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850 (2001).
142 See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 542 ("All laws are selective to some extent, but categories of selection are of
paramount concern when a law has the incidental effect of burdening religious practice."); id. at 543 ("The
ordinances are underinclusive for those ends [of protecting public health and preventing animal cruelty]. They
fail to prohibit nonreligious conduct that endangers these interests in a similar or greater degree than Santeria
sacrifice does. The underinclusion is substantial, not inconsequential."); Smith, 494 U.S. at 884
(distinguishing Unemployment Compensation Cases because, inter alia, they did not involve "an across-the-
board criminal prohibition on a particular form of conduct.").
143 See MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 136, at 212 (suggesting that there is no difference between an
exception to a law and a simple lack of coverage by the law); see also Carol M. Kaplan, Note, The Devil is in
the Details: Neutral, Generally Applicable Laws and Exceptions From Smith, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1067
(2000) (arguing that a constitutional rule that mandated a religious exemption whenever a law allows any sort
of secular exemption "clearly flies in the face of the holding in Smith"); Kenneth D. Sansom, Note, Sharing the
Burden: Exploring the Space Between Uniform and Specific Applicability in Current Free Exercise
Jurisprudence, 77 TEX. L. REV. 753, 768 (1999) ("One can posit that a law which includes even a single
secular departure, but does not match it with an equivalent accommodation departure is not generally
applicable for the purposes of the Free Exercise Clause because it is underinclusive in that there is some
secular conduct to which it does not apply. Lukumi does not, however, support such a simple decision.").
144 Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Normalized Free Exercise Clause: Three Abnormalities, 75 IND. L.J. 77,
119 (2000) [hereinafter Gedicks, The Normalized Free Exercise Clause]; see also Robert W. Tuttle, How Firm
a Foundation? Protecting Religious Land Uses after Boeme, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 861, 888-90 (2000)
(arguing for a similar conclusion based upon the "hard-look" rational basis review of City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), in which the Court invalidated denial of a special use permit for
a group home for the mentally retarded by rejecting purported distinctions between the home and other
permitted uses).
145 Gedicks, The Normalized Free Exercise Clause, supra note 144, at 118-19; accord Sansom, supra
note 143, at 769 (arguing that a religious exemption from a law is appropriate under the General Applicability
Exception when a secular exemption permitted by the law would "undermine the purpose of the law's general
proscription or mandate," and allowing a religious exemption "would not undermine that purpose any more
than the secular departure already does"); see also Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of
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suppose that the standard prohibits all officer beards for image and unity
purposes, except those worn by undercover officers. Granting an exemption to
the latter does not undermine these purposes, because undercover officers by
definition have concealed their association with the police force and thus do
not project any image at all on behalf of the police force. 146 Similarly, because
undercover officers do not interact with regular officers as part of the regular
uniformed chain of command, their beards do not disrupt force unity to the
same extent as beards worn by regular uniformed officers.
In sum, Smith and Lukumi suggest that a religiously neutral law does not
fail the test of general applicability merely by being modestly or even
substantially underinclusive; rather, the law must be so dramatically
underinclusive that religious conduct is virtually the only conduct to which the
law applies. The Court apparently will tolerate a substantial amount of
underinclusion before finding that a law is not generally applicable, so long as
the underinclusion stops short of religious targeting. 147 Whether the doctrinal
hurdle represented by general applicability will be raised so far as to require
heightened scrutiny of laws that exempt secular conduct but not similarly
situated religious conduct, as suggested by some lower court decisions,
48
remains to be seen.
2000 ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) ("No government shall impose or implement a land use
regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a
nonreligious assembly or institution.").
146 Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 366 (1999).
141 See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 557 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment):
In my view, the defect of lack of neutrality applies primarily to those laws that by their terms
impose disabilities on the basis of religion; whereas the defect of lack of general applicability
applies primarily to those laws which, though neutral in their terms, through their design,
construction, or enforcement target the practices of a particular religion for discriminatory
treatment.
Id. (citations omitted); ef Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1072, 1073 (1992)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("We have ... in our takings law frequently looked to the generality of a regulation of
property .... [Clourts have long recognized the difference between a regulation that targets one or two
parcels of land and a regulation that enforces a statewide policy.").
148 See, e.g., Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania, 381 F.3d 202 (3d Cir. 2003) (upholding injunction against
collection of exotic animal fees from Native American who owned black bears for use in religious ceremonies,
because law providing for the collection of fees was exempted zoos and circuses and provided for additional
discretionary waivers); Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 165-68 (3d Cir. 2002)
(upholding injunction against enforcement of ordinance prohibiting signs on city-owned utility poles, as
against Orthodox Jews who had used the poles to mark an eruv, on ground that city had not enforced the
ordinance to prevent display of some name and address signs and certain symbols on the poles); Fraternal
Order of Police, 170 F.3d at 367 (holding that police department's refusal to exempt Muslim police officers
from no-beard rule when rule provided for medical exemptions is subject to strict scrutiny, because "[w]e are
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B. Exceptions Calling for Strict Review: "Hybrid Rights" and Systems of
Individualized Assessment
Smith articulated two exceptions to the General Rule: when a law burdens
constitutional rights besides the free exercise of religion-the Hybrid Rights
Exception-and when the law provides for detailed consideration of particular
facts and circumstances that might excuse a person from complying with the
law, but does not allow the burden the law might impose on religious beliefs to
be considered as one of such facts or circumstances justifying
noncompliance-the Individualized Assessment Exception.
1. The Hybrid Rights "Exception"
Few people take the Hybrid Rights Exception seriously. 149 The exception
would make a difference only in the situation where a personal interest was
protected by two constitutional rights, either of which by itself would call for
only deferential scrutiny, but which when combined somehow achieve a
synergistic constitutional mass that triggers heightened scrutiny.' 50  If one
constitutional right is strong enough by itself to trigger heightened judicial
at a loss to understand why religious exemptions threaten important city interests but medical exemptions do
not"); Black Hawk v. Commonwealth, 114 F. Supp. 2d 327, 331-32 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (holding that statute
giving government authority to grant exemptions from provision requiring destruction of aggressive wild
animals subject to strict scrutiny); Keeler v. Mayor & City Council of Cumberland, 940 F. Supp. 879, 886 (D.
Md. 1996) (holding that application of historic preservation ordinance against church is subject to strict
scrutiny when ordinance provided for exemptions in case of a "major improvement of benefit to the city,"
"financial hardship," or circumstances that would not be in the "interests of the city" or of "a majority of
persons in the community," but did not provide for religious exemptions); Rader v. Johnston, 924 F. Supp.
1540, 1553 (D. Neb. 1996) (holding that refusal to exempt evangelical Christian from parietal rule requiring
that freshman live in university housing is subject to strict scrutiny where "exceptions are granted ... for a
variety of nonreligious reasons, ... [but] not granted for religious reasons.") (internal quotations omitted);
Horen v. Commonwealth, 479 S.E.2d 553, 557 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that government intent to
discriminate against religion may be inferred from state law prohibiting possession of owl feathers, which
exempted "taxidermists, academics, researchers, museums, and educational institutions," but not those who
possess owl feathers for bona fide religious uses). But see Jackson v. Dist. of Columbia, 89 F. Supp. 2d 48,
65-69 (D.D.C. 2000) (declining to apply general applicability analysis to under inclusive classifications
burdening free exercise rights of incarcerated prisoners).
149 See Alan E. Brownstein, Constitutional Questions about Vouchers, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. Am. L. 119,
119-20 (2000) (calling the Hybrid Rights Exception "unintelligible"); e.g., Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 151 F.
Supp. 2d 1326, 1339, 1341, 1342 (D. Utah 2001) (recognizing the Hybrid Rights Exception, but holding that
the scrutiny level it requires is only a "more than merely reasonable" relation between the government's
asserted interest and the legislation that imposes the burden on religious exercise).
150 See Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants to Stop the Church: Homosexual Rights Legislation, Public
Policy, and Religious Freedom, 69 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 393, 430-31 (1994); Rodney A. Smolla, The Free
Exercise of Religion after the Fall: The Case for Intermediate Scrutiny, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 925, 930
(1998).
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scrutiny, then the other right is surplusage. 15 1 If neither right is sufficient to
trigger heightened scrutiny, it is unclear why the two of them together should
trigger such scrutiny.
Accordingly, most courts that have employed the hybrid rights exception to
create a religious exemption have used it only as a secondary or alternate
justification for the exemption holding.' 52  Although a few courts have
acknowledged the possibility of hybrid rights doctrine,' 53 others have rejected
it outright, 154 and only one court has unambiguously relied on this exception as
the sole basis for excusing a believer from complying with a religiously neutral
and generally applicable law. 1
55
2. The Individualized Assessment Exception
In order to distinguish (rather than overrule) the Unemployment
Compensation Cases in Smith, the Court contended that denial of a religious
exemption from a burdensome law should be strictly scrutinized when the law
provides a structure or procedure for "individualized assessment" of exemption
claims, but does not allow the law's burden on religion to play any part of such
assessment. 156  The Individualized Assessment Exception to Smith is best
understood as deriving from suspicion of underinclusive government action
when a law grants government agents substantial discretion in determining the
151 See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 567 (Souter, J., concurring); see also Note, Neutral Rules, supra note 140, at
1723 ("Counting the number of rights implicated is not a useful measure of how burdened a party is by a
neutral law; and if the Court is willing to evaluate the seriousness of the burden when two rights are
implicated, there seems little reason not to do the same in cases involving one constitutional right.").
152 William L. Esser IV, Note, Religious Hybrids in the Lower Courts: Free Exercise Plus or
Constitutional Smoke Screen?, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 211, 242-43 (1998) ("[Wlhen a court allows a hybrid
to 'win' by applying strict scrutiny to the claim, it never does so as the primary basis for the decision .... The
'success' of hybrid claims is directly tied to the constitutional strength of the right with which free exercise is
combined."); Kaplan, supra note 143, at 1063 ("[W]hile many courts have inferred that Smith creates a 'hybrid
rights' exception, most apply it as an alternative theory for assessing the validity of a free exercise claim that
they have already analyzed under the Sherbert exception, or under the Smith test.").
153 E.g., Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 699-700 (10th Cir. 1998); see, e.g.,
Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (lst Cir. 1995); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 151 F. Supp.
2d 1326, 1337 (D. Utah 2001).
154 See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 240 F.2d 533, 561 (6th
Cir. 2001), aff'd on other grounds, 536 U.S. 127 (2002); Kissinger v. Bd. of Trustees of Ohio State Univ., 5
F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993).
155 Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 703-04 (9th Cir. 1999), vacated on
ripeness grounds on rehearing en banc, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000).
156 Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
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scope of the law's coverage and enforcement with respect to a fundamental
right. 157
For example, unemployment compensation programs generally excuse
applicants from complying with program eligibility requirements whenever
they can show "good cause."' 58 In other words, unemployment compensation
programs presuppose that many applicants will be excused from satisfying
particular eligibility requirements for receipt of benefits, and that the widely
varying reasons applicants give will be individually considered in light of the
purposes and practical limitations of the programs.'59 Smith held that "where
the State has in place a system of individualized exemptions, it may not refuse
to extend that system to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling
reason."' 160 In short, Smith mandated that when the government considers
individual circumstances in administering the requirements of a program, it
must excuse program participants from those requirements that burden their
religious practices, even though the burden is incidental.'
61
A close analogy to the Individualized Assessment Exception exists in the
Supreme Court's doctrine relating to so-called "standardless licensing" of
expression under the Speech Clause.' 62  Under the Speech Clause, licensing
and other regulatory schemes that grant government discretion to prevent
speech ex ante (as opposed to punishing it ex post) are subject to significant
constitutional restraints. Unless such discretion is controlled or limited by
substantive standards governing the issuance of a license, it is presumptively
unconstitutional as a prior restraint. 163  Limiting standards must be both
157 Gedicks, The Normalized Free Exercise Clause, supra note 144, at 115 n.170.
158 Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
159 See id. ('The 'good cause' standard created a mechanism for individualized exemptions.") (quoting
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)).
'60 Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. The Court did not apply this reasoning to Smith itself because the religiously
motivated conduct at issue there was not merely inconsistent with program eligibility requirements, as in the
Unemployment Compensation Cases, but also violated a criminal prohibition. See id. at 876, 884-85.
161 Cf. Bowen v. Roy. 476 U.S. 693, 721-22 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
result) ("To the extent that other food stamp and welfare applicants are, in fact, offered exceptions and special
assistance in response to their inability to 'provide' required information, it would seem that a religious
inability should be given no less deference.").
162 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech . .
163 See, e.g., FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 225-27 (1990); City of Lakewood v. Plain
Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757 (1988); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 321-24 (1958); Kunz v.
New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293-95 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 560-61 (1948); Lovell v. City of
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451-52 (1938).
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content-neutral 164 and "narrow, objective, and definite"; 165 broad appeals to a
state's police power do not pass muster.' 66  Procedurally, licensing schemes
must provide that the government shoulder the burden of proving that the
proposed speech is not constitutionally protected, that the government either
issue the license for the speech or seek judicial review of its refusal to issue it
within a specified and brief period of time, that any restraint on the expression
in advance of a final judicial determination be limited to "preservation of the
status quo," and that the final judicial decision on the restraint be rendered
promptly. 1
67
Unfettered discretion was also an alternative holding for the result in Yick
Wo v. Hopkins,168 in which the Court invalidated a facially neutral San
Francisco laundry regulation ordinance that had been applied by the board of
supervisors so as to grant a permit to operate a laundry to virtually every
Caucasian applicant, and to deny a permit to every Chinese applicant. Yick Wo
is usually included in American constitutional law casebooks to illustrate how
a pattern of racial discrimination will be found to violate the Equal Protection
Clause even when it takes place under a facially neutral law.169 The ordinancein Yick Wo was declared unconstitutional on its face, however, not as it was
164 See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133 (1992); City of Lakewood, 486 U.S.
at 760.
165 E.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969).
166 See, e.g., City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 769, 772 (holding "not in the public interest" and "necessary
and reasonable" to be insufficient as standards for controlling discretion); Shutlesworth, 394 U.S. at 150
(same with respect to "public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good order, morals or convenience");
Staub, 355 U.S. at 321 (same with respect to "the character of the applicant, the nature of the...
organization ... and its effects upon the general welfare.').
167 See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965). Professor Tribe additionally lists as
procedural requirements for a constitutional licensing scheme that an adversarial hearing on the application be
held when possible, and that any prior restraint ordered by a court be stayed unless the government provides
for immediate appellate review. See TRIBE 1988, supra note 77, §§ 12-39, at 1059-61.
Although Freedman itself entailed review of a criminally enforceable film censorship statute, its
procedural protections have since been applied by the Court in other First Amendment contexts. See, e.g.,
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 547-48, 559 (1975) (use of public auditorium for
performance of play including nudity); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 411-12, 415 (1971) (postal stop orders
on delivery of pornographic materials); see also Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 162-63 (Harlan, J., concurring)
(arguing that the negative First Amendment consequences of standardless prior restraint of political
demonstrations are more serious than those of film censorship); Vince Blasi, Prior Restraints on
Demonstrations, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1482, 1549-50 (1970) (arguing that a "thorough comparison of film
censorship and demonstration regulation" suggests that the Freedman factors should govern judicial review of
licensing schemes for the latter as well).
168 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
169 See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 750 (13th ed. 1997);
see WILLIAM B. LOCKHART ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTrTUTION 1182-83 (8th ed. 1996).
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applied. The Court explained that because the ordinance contained no general
standards controlling the board's decisions regarding who would receive
permits, it thereby gave the supervisors "comr!ete discretion as to whom they
would reward or punish."'170  Unfettered bureaucratic discretion in granting
laundry permits violated the Equal Protection Clause because withou
standards for granting permits, the competition for permits would unavoidably
end in favoritism and corruption. 71
The standardless licensing decisions reflect the reality that government
discretion is frequently exercised to disadvantage controversial or unpopular
speech, just as Yick Wo reflects the reality that such discretion is frequently
exercised to disadvantage unpopular racial minorities. As such, these
decisions resonate with Smith's requirement that strict scrutiny be applied to
government decisions that deny religious exemptions within the context of a
system providing for individualized assessment of a law's burdens on secular
conduct, 172 for it is the regrettable reality in the United States that government
discretion with respect to religious activities is likewise frequently exercised to
disadvantage controversial or unpopular religions. It has been widely
documented, for example, that local government discretion in zoning and land
use decisions involving religious uses is frequently exercised to deny or
otherwise to penalize uses sought by unpopular or unfamiliar minority
religions, often at the same time that similar and even identical uses are
approved for larger, more established religions.
173
A discretionary government choice to benefit or to burden certain activities
and not others does not normally trigger heightened scrutiny of the
classification that distributes the benefit or burden, even when the
classification is underinclusive, i.e., even when the law does not apply to
170 See 118 U.S. at 366-67.
171 See generally HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESEIGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER
ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 71 (1993).
172 Ira C. Lupu, The Case Against Legislative Codification of Religious Liberty, 21 CARDozo L. REv. 565,
573 (1999) ("Long prior to Smith, our civil liberties tradition had recognized the dangers of permitting local
officials to exercise licensing authority over expressive activity without the benefit of determinate criteria.
The absence of such criteria invites discriminatory treatment of groups disfavored by local decision makers.").
173 See, e.g., Amicus Brief of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, App., Discrimination
against Minority Churches in Zoning Cases, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), available at 1997
WL 10290; Tuttle, supra note 144, passim.
20051
EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
activities that are comparable to activities to which the law does apply. 174  If
the Free Exercise Clause grants special protection to religious activity,
however, as the Speech Clause does to expression, then it would seem that,
like expression, religious activity should receive protection from the
standardless exercise of government discretion by granting to religious activity
at least the degree of protection which the Constitution grants to activities that
are not singled out for special protection, if not more. The individualized
assessment exception to the General Rule is thus an example of the broader
meaning of general applicability that the Court has not yet expressly and fully
embraced.
C. The Rule of Permissive Accommodation: Anti-Establishment and Equal
Protection Pitfalls
An important dictum in the Smith decision makes clear the majority's
opinion that Congress and the state legislatures are free to enact religious
exemptions by statute despite Smith's holding that the Free Exercise does not
generally mandate such exemptions. 175  Such statutory exemptions are
generally known as "permissive"-as distinguished from "mandatory"-
constitutional accommodations of religion. Despite this apparent Supreme
Court approval of Permissive Accommodations, both Establishment and Equal
Protection Clause doctrines pose serious obstacles to them.
174 See TRIBE 1988, supra note 77, §16-4, at 1447; e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489
(1955) (observing that a legislature may legitimately believe that "[elvils in the same field may be of different
dimensions and proportions, requiring different remedies," or choose to proceed "one step at a time,
addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. The legislature
may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others" (internal citations omitted)).
175 See 494 U.S. at 890 (dictum):
Values that are protected against government interference through enshrinement in the Bill of
Rights are not thereby insulated from the political process. Just as a society that believes in the
negative protection accorded to the press by the First Amendment is likely to enact laws that
affirmatively foster the dissemination of the printed word, so also a society that believes in the
negative protection accorded to religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of that value in
its legislation as well... But to say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is
permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally required, and that the
appropriate occasions for its creation can be discerned by the courts.
Id.; accord Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705 (1994) ("[W]e do not
deny that the Constitution allows the State to accommodate religious needs by alleviating special burdens. Our
cases leave no doubt that in commanding neutrality the Religion Clauses do not require the government to be




The Supreme Court's early decisions developing Establishment Clause
doctrine emphasized separation, imposing special disabilities on religion that
were not imposed on secular activities. For example, religious elementary and
secondary schools, which in the United States are necessarily private because
of the Establishment Clause, were generally denied the benefits of government
financial assistance in service to the value of church-state separation, despite
the fact that public schools and private secular elementary and secondary
schools were eligible for such aid.176  Similarly, government in the United
States has long been thought to be disabled from funding, endorsing, or
generally participating in religious worship, though it is not prevented from
funding, endorsing, or generally participating in comparable secular
ceremonies, such as patriotic or political events.177  From the perspective of
these Establishment Clause holdings, special protection for religion in the form
of religious exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause seemed a permissible
way to balance the special disabilities imposed on religious activity under the
Establishment Clause. 1
78
This balancing justification for Permissive Accommodations has lost much
of its force over the last generation as the Court has transformed much of
Establishment Clause doctrine from the articulation of structural boundaries
that disallow most government interactions with religion, into an equality right
that demands that government actions be religiously neutral among religious
denominations, and between religion and nonreligion. 179 Most of the former
disabilities imposed on religious activity by Establishment Clause
176 FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE 45-52 (1995).
177 See generally Frederick Mark Gedicks, A Two-Track Theory of the Establishment Clause, 43 B.C. L.
REv. 1071 (2002).
178 See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611 (1993);
Michael W. McConnell, A Response to Professor Marshall, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 329 (1991); see also Kent
Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of "Tests ", SuP. CT. REV. 323, 340-41 (1995):
In general, religious beliefs and practices place demands on people that are more
intense, less subject to reasons that regulate civil society, more likely to generate
conflicts with the state if not accommodated, than do nonreligious beliefs and
practices. Further, accommodation to those beliefs and practices may be appropriate
because the Establishment Clause places particular limitations on assistance to religion
that it does not extend to other beliefs and practices.
Id.
179 See Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibility of Religious
Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 555, 568-72 (1998) [hereinafter Gedicks, An Unfirn
Foundation].
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separationism have been removed; 18  at present, there are only a few areas in
which the Establishment Clause imposes special disabilities on religion which
would provide a justification for religious exemptions. These include
prohibitions on government encouragement of or participation in religious
worship, 181  on the delegation of governmental authority to religious
organizations, 182  on government consideration of essentially theological
questions,' 83 and on the use of government authority for wholly religious
purposes, i.e., laws lacking a plausible secular purpose.' 84  After Locke v.
Davey, 185 one can also add here those circumstances in which religious
individuals or organizations are specially burdened by a more restrictive state
establishment clause or other similar state constitutional provision.'
86
180 Supreme Court decisions since 1981 have removed Establishment Clause obstacles to the use of public
forums by religious groups and individuals. See Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753
(1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263 (1981). Several cases reference government use of religious symbols. See County of Allegheny
v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). Other cases discuss in-kind
government aid to religious schools. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 1296 (2000) (overruling Wolman v.
Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977)); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234-
35, 236 (1997) (overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruling in part Sch. Dist. of Grand
Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) and limiting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)); Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993). For reference to tax credits granted for monies spent at or on
behalf of religious schools, see Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). For reference to cash subsidies paid to
or on behalf of religious groups, see Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (limiting Comm. for
Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973)); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ.
of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
For an account of the foregoing developments, see Frederick Mark Gedicks, Neutrality in
Establishment Clause Interpretation, in CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN CRISIS: DEBATING NEUTRALITY 191
(Stephen V. Monsma ed., 2002).
181 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Sch. Dist. of
Abington Township Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (invalidating
public school prayer).
182 Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (invalidating special
school district drawn to coincide with boundaries of orthodox Jewish community); Larkin v. Grendel's Den,
Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (invalidating church veto power over liquor licenses granted to bars and restaurants
located in the vicinity).
183 Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Presbyterian Ch. v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem. Ch., 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
184 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (invalidating mandatory teaching of creationism); Stone v.
Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (invalidating mandatory display of the Ten Commandments); Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (invalidating prohibition on teaching evolution); McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333
U.S. 203 (1948) (prohibition of in-class sectarian religious instruction).
185 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
186 See Part II.C supra.
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Contemporary Establishment Clause doctrine thus presents a special
complication for religious exemptions. 187  Permissive Accommodations are
religious accommodations imposed by the legislature rather than imposed by
the judiciary. Because neutrality generally bans government action that gives
special advantages to religion, and because religious exemptions are no longer
required under the Free Exercise Clause, Permissive Accommodations would
seem to be justifiable only in the small number of cases where they correct for
or balance a special disability suffered by religion under the Establishment or
otherwise. For example, the Court has upheld a statutory exemption of
nonprofit religious groups from the anti-discrimination provisions of Title
VI1188 "to equalize religious entities with nonreligious entities that face no
comparable statutory impediment to hiring those with ideological loyalty.,' 89
The Democratic National Committee, in other words, can require that all of its
employees be Democrats, but in the absence of an exemption from Title VII,
the Roman Catholic Church cannot require that its employees be Roman
Catholic. A Permissive Accommodation that exempts the church from the
religious antidiscrimination provisions of federal employment laws thus
restores equality between religious and political organizations, allowing the
former as well as the latter to hire employees who share a commitment to the
group's mission.
On the other hand, a Permissive Accommodation that does not compensate
for some special disability imposed on religious activity functions much like a
state subsidy or endorsement of such activity. For example, an exemption
from the payment of sales taxes on the sale of Bibles and other religious books
and magazines simply gives such religious publications a price advantage with
respect to secular publications. 19 On the other hand, however, one might
argue that so long as Permissive Accommodations are relatively narrow, they
are at least balanced by the few special disabilities that continue to be imposed
on religion under the Establishment Clause, even if there is not a direct
187 See Ira C. Lupu, Why the Congress Was Wrong and the Court Was Right-Reflections on City of
Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 793, 806 (1998) [hereinafter Lupu, Why Congress Was Wrong]
(arguing that judges perceive that granting religion favorable legislative treatment in the form of
accommodations, as in RFRA, is "fraught with perils on both sides. Underprotecting religion presents free
exercise problems; overprotecting it suggests Establishment Clause concerns. Every move raises the danger of
discrimination among sects").
188 Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-40 (1987).
189 Lupu, Why Congress Was Wrong, supra note 187, at 809.
19o See Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 704 (1994); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 14
(1989); see also Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (invalidating state statute mandating
that employees be excused from working on their Sabbath).
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correspondence between a Permissive Accommodation and any particular
Establishment Clause disability.
In short, legislative exemptions defined in terms of religion are now
justifiable only in the relatively narrow (and narrowing) range of cases in
which religion suffers from Establishment Clause or other special
disadvantages. Because in these areas religious organizations and individuals
carry special burdens not imposed on similarly situated secular organizations
and individuals, it remains consistent with constitutional principles to allow the
legislature to provide special relief to religion from other, related burdens if it
so chooses.
2. Equal Protection Problems
In the standard model of equal protection analysis, a classification scheme
is upheld under the Equal Protection Clause so long as there is a rational basis
for it-that is, if there is any conceivable government goal that would be at
least marginally advanced by distinctions based on the classifying trait.
191
Certain bases of classification, however, are considered suspicious because
they are highly improbable means of achieving any legitimate government
goal. 192  For example, classifications which disadvantage individuals based
upon their race are virtually always motivated by animus towards the
disadvantaged racial group rather than by any legitimate government goal. A
second model of equal protection doctrine thus subjects racial and other such
"suspect" classifications to strict judicial scrutiny. To withstand constitutional
challenge, the goal of a suspect classification must be "compelling," not just
legitimate, and the classification itself must be closely, not just conceivably,
related to this compelling goal-that is, "necessary" or "closely tailored" to
achieving it. Virtually all suspect classifications are found to violate the Equal
Protection Clause when subjected to strict scrutiny. 193
Although invidious racial classifications have long been presumptively
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause,' 94 until recently it was not
191 E.g., United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106
(1949).
192 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982).
193 See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972) (observing that strict scrutiny is .'strict' in theory and
fatal in fact").
194 See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
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clear whether the same presumption applied to so-called "benign" or
"remedial" racial classifications, such as affirmative action programs. In
contrast to invidious racial discrimination, whose purpose is to disadvantage a
minority racial class, benign or remedial racial classifications are premised on
the government's desire to assist a minority racial class. After a generation of
uncertainty, 195 the Supreme Court held in 1995 that benign and remedial racial
classifications by both the federal and state governments are subject to so-
called "strict" judicial scrutiny, 196 meaning that such classifications will be
upheld under the Equal Protection Clause only if they are "narrowly tailored to
further compelling governmental interests." 197 The Court suggested, however,
that applying strict scrutiny to benign or remedial uses of race by government
would not necessarily end in their constitutional invalidation, 198 and it recently
confirmed this suggestion by upholding under strict scrutiny race-conscious
procedures for admission to a state university law school.199
195 After the issue first arose in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978),
several Justices consistently maintained that benign racial classifications are subject only to intermediate
scrutiny-that is, such classifications do not violate the equal protection clause if they are "substantially
related" to an "important" government goal. Id. at 359 (Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall, & Blackmun,
JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also Wygant v. Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
301-02 (1986) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448, 518-19 (1980) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment). Although
in 1989, a majority of the Justices apparently held that benign racial classifications by state governments are
subject to strict scrutiny, see City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (plurality
opinion of O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White, & Kennedy, JJ.); id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment) ("I agree... with Justice O'Conner's conclusion that strict scrutiny must be applied to all
governmental classification by race, whether or not its asserted purpose is 'remedial' or 'benign."'), the very
next term the Court held that use of such classifications by the federal government triggered only intermediate
scrutiny, see Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990).
196 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (overruling Metro Broadcasting, 497
U.S. at 547) ("[W]e hold today that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state or local
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In other words, such
classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling
governmental interests.").
197 Id. at 227.
198 Id. at 237 (disavowing that "strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact,"' and suggesting that
"pervasive, systematic, and obstinate discriminatory conduct" might justify remedial racial classification)
(citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment); United
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion)); see also Michael J. Perry,
Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1045 (1979)
(arguing that benign racial preferences that satisfy intermediate scrutiny should satisfy strict scrutiny as well).
199 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) (holding that state-sponsored law school's
consideration of an applicant's race as one competitive factor among many others in the admissions process
was narrowly tailored to the school's compelling interest in achieving a diverse student body).
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The Equal Protection Clause presents a doctrinal complication for
Permissive Accommodations. As I have indicated, government classifications
that disadvantage religion have long been considered illegitimate under the
Equal Protection Clause.200 Although classifications that assist religion have
not been thought to raise constitutional issues outside of the Establishment
Clause, the new equal protection doctrine that subjects even benign and
remedial racial classifications to strict scrutiny suggests that religiously defined
legislative exemptions similarly constitute a suspect classification that is
presumptively invalid under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court may well
find that compensating for special disabilities imposed on religion by the
Establishment Clause,201 like achievement of a diverse student body,
constitutes a government interest that is sufficiently compelling to satisfy strict
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. 202  In light of the Court's
constitutional invalidation of formulaic and otherwise rigid racial preferences
when used by government in the absence of prior unconstitutional
discrimination, it is questionable that the Court would uphold blanket
government exemptions restricted to religious groups and individuals, at least
when such exemptions are not required by the Free Exercise Clause. In the
absence of a religious disability or the need to correct for religious
discrimination, then, legislative exemptions for religious practices would
appear to be vulnerable to invalidation under the Equal Protection Clause.
VI. ATrITUDES AND BACKGROUND THAT AFFECT INTERPRETATION OF LAWS
Three current trends exert significant influence on the interpretation and
implementation of religious freedom laws in the United States: the persistence
of controversies posed by judicial review of executive and congressional
action, the recent revitalization of judicially enforced federalism norms, and
the loss by religion of a unique social and cultural status at a time when
equality rationales predominate over liberty rationales in the development of
contemporary constitutional doctrine.
20 See discussion supra Part l.B.
201 See discussion supra Part VI.C.2.
202 See Gedicks, The Normalized Free Exercise Clause, supra note 144, at 100 ("Although classifications
that assist religion have not traditionally been thought to raise constitutional issues outside of the
Establishment Clause, the new equal protection doctrine that subjects even benign racial classifications to strict
scrutiny suggests that religiously defined legislative exemptions violate the Equal Protection Clause, at least
when they do not compensate for an Establishment Clause or other special disability.").
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A. The Persistent Question of Judicial Power
From the beginning, politicians, judges, and scholars in the United States
have argued about the limits of judicial power under the Constitution. Barely a
decade after the founding, Federalists and Republicans squared off in bitter
conflict over the extent to which the will of the Republican electorate could be
subverted by the unelected and life-tenured judges of the Federalist judiciary.
As Professor Friedman has described this period, "[b]ehind every act of
Federalist judges was seen a conspiracy to deprive the people of power. The
Federalists, for their part, saw the judiciary as the sole bulwark against a
leveling democracy."
203
Over the years, the practice of judicial review has come in for particular
criticism. Its legitimacy confirmed by Chief Justice Marshall's brilliant feat of
misdirection in Marbury v. Madison,20 4 judicial review refers to the
invalidation by federal courts of federal and state legislative and executive
action when found to be inconsistent with the Constitution. "The root
difficulty," observed Professor Bickel, "is that judicial review is a counter-
majoritarian force in our system .... [Wihen the Supreme Court declares
unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an elected executive, it
thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people of the here and now; it
exercises control, not [o]n behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it.,, 205
Conceding that the "complexities and perplexities" of liberal democracy
frequently frustrate popular will as constituted at any given political moment,
Bickel nevertheless concluded that one cannot blink the "essential reality that
judicial review is a deviant institution in the American democracy," because it
entails the frustration of popular will through the intervention of unelected
federal judges.206 In American jurisprudence, then, the "countermajoritariandifficulty" has come to refer to "the problem of reconciling judicial review
203 Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial
Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 358 (1998) [hereinafter Friedman, Judicial Supremacy]; see also William
E. Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background of John Marshall's Constitutional Jurisprudence, 76 MICH. L.
REV. 893, 928-29 (1978) ("One [party] sought to resolve all issues according to the will of the people and the
other sought to resolve them according to fixed principles of law.").
204 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803); see also Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304 (1816)
(holding that federal judiciary possesses constitutional power to review the constitutionality of state court
judgments).
205 ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-17 (1962).
206 Id. at 18; see also Rosenfeld, supra note 48, at 1311 ("There is a long-standing tradition that conceives
institutional legitimacy and political justice in terms of consent.").
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with popular governance in a democratic society,, 20 7 and "countermajoritarian
criticism" to "a challenge to the legitimacy or propriety of judicial review on
the grounds that it is inconsistent with the will of the people, or a majority of
the people, whose will, it is implied, should be sovereign in a democracy."
20 8
Although countermajoritarian criticism has been around since the founding
era, the countermajoritarian difficulty has been a peculiar preoccupation of the
twentieth century. 29 At the beginning of the century, political progressives
criticized a conservative Supreme Court for invalidating federal and state laws
in the name of "freedom of contract" and other unenumerated rights.2  By the
latter part of the century, the political roles had reversed, and conservatives
were attacking the Court for invalidating laws in the name of a different set of
equally unenumerated rights.2 11  The pendulum swung yet again in the early
twenty-first century, with liberal criticism of the Court's intervention in the
Presidential election of 2000, and its growing number of decisions invalidating
207 Friedman, Judicial Supremacy, supra note 203, at 334-35.
208 Id. at 354.
209 Id. at 340, 344-46; see also Rett R. Ludwikowski, Constitutional Culture of the New East-Central
European Democracies, 29 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 1, 21-22 (2000) (observing that discussions of judicial
activism are "an omnipresent component of constitutional culture in North America," and that "discussions of
the 'counter-majoritarian problem' are an intrinsic component of the Western political culture," in which
"[c]onstitutional scholars endlessly agonize over the limits of intervention of non-elected judges into the
constitution-making processes.").
210 E.g., James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
HARV. L. REv. 129 (1893); see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57-58 (1905) (striking down state
maximum-hour legislation as infringing upon the natural right of an individual to be "free in his person and in
his power to contract in relation to his own labor"); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 590 (1897). The
Court construed the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as protecting
not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person,. .. [but
also] the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them
in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to
pursue any livelihood or avocation; and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be
proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above
mentioned.
Id.
211 E.g., ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 110-26
(1990) (cataloguing the interpretive excesses of the Warren and Burger Courts); REx E. LEE, A LAWYER
LOOKS AT THE CONSTITUTION 188 (1981):
[The privacy cases] and the abortion cases represent a resurrection of Lochner because they vest
in the judiciary the license to roam at will through the territory of legislative policymaking. If an
unmentioned constitutional right can be pieced together by judiciary out of bits and scraps that
bear some resemblance to a variety of other provisions in the Constitution, then there is little
limit to the extent to which judges can substitute their own judgment for that of the legislature.
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federal laws in the name of unenumerated limits on congressional power and
other principles of federalism not appearing in the constitutional text.
212
Among other things, both critiques emphasized the need for the unelected, life-
tenured federal judiciary generally to defer to the will of democratic majorities
reflected in laws enacted by Congress and the state legislatures, particularly in
the absence of any clear warrant in the constitutional text for invalidating such
laws.
2 13
By the 1970s, "judicial activism" had become a short-hand criticism of the
tendency of federal judges to interpret enumerated constitutional rights too
broadly, and wholly to create unenumerated rights, as justifications for
invalidating laws enacted by Congress and the state legislatures. Today's
212 Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2000) (observing that the Eleventh
Amendment applies to bar lawsuits by citizens against their own states, even though "by its terms the
Amendment applies only to suits against a State by citizens of another State .. "); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98,
109 (2000) (invalidating state recount because of lack of uniform standards for hand-counting ballots, but
limiting that holding "to the present circumstances .... ); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728 (1999) (holding
that the "structure of the original Constitution" prohibits Congress from subjecting the states to suits for money
damages in state court if such suits would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment in federal court); Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 924 n.13 (1997) (observing that a constitutional system of "dual sovereignty is
reflected in numerous constitutional provisions .... "); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57
(1992) ("The Tenth Amendment likewise restrains the power of Congress, but this limit is not derived from the
text of the Tenth Amendment itself .... Instead, the Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of the Federal
Government is subject to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power to the States."); see also Fed. Mar.
Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002) (holding that a state could not be subjected to
litigation before a federal administrative agency based on principles of constitutional structure); Nat'l League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 843 (1976) ("The Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy
that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function
effectively in a federal system."); Richard W. Gamett, The New Federalism, the Spending Power, and Federal
Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 29 (2004) (arguing that "because neither the States' abstract dignity"
that the Court defends in its Eleventh Amendment decisions, nor the "immunity that is thought to result from
it, is obviously required by or described in the relevant constitutional text, this theme has opened the Court up
to perhaps its most formidable criticism").
213 See, e.g., BORK, supra note 211, at 8-9 (criticizing Supreme Court decisions approving racial and
gender-based affirmative action, abortion rights, restrictions on the death penalty, on the ground that "under
the Constitution, these are questions left for the people and their elected representatives, not for courts, to
decide."); id. at 66 (criticizing the Court's fundamental rights/equal protection doctrine, under which the Court
identifies and enforces rights "without guidance from any written law. This is indistinguishable from a power
to say what the natural law is and, in addition, to assume the power to enforce the judge's version of that
natural law against the people's elected representatives."); see also Thayer, supra note 210, at 150 (arguing
that to avoid encroaching upon legislative and congressional power and prerogatives, federal courts exercising
the power of constitutional review must not decide "the true meaning of the constitution, but [merely] whether
legislation is sustainable or not.") (emphasis removed).
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conservatives condemn "activist judges" rather than "judicial activism," but
the intended meaning is the same.
2 14
One conservative strategy for curbing what has been viewed as
unconstrained constitutional adjudication by federal courts is to insist on
formalism in constitutional adjudication. 21  The formalist move has taken
several forms. The most well-known is that of original intent jurisprudence or
"originalism," which presumes that the constitutional text contains an
objective, stable, and discoverable historical meaning that can function as a
216fixed rule of decision in constitutional controversies. Political conservatives
argue that originalism is the only interpretive methodology that treats the
Constitution as law, that is consistent with democratic rule, and that effectively
217prevents judges from grafting their personal values onto the Constitution.
Another manifestation of the formalist move is the conservative attack on ad
hoc balancing-perhaps the signature constitutional methodology of the
Warren Court-whereby intrusions upon individual rights committed by
government laws or actions are "balanced" against the government's interests
in enforcing such laws or taking such actions. 218  In place of balancing,
conservatives seek to impose on federal judges categorical rules which, they
214 See, e.g., Ruth Marcus, Booting the Bench: There's new ferocity in talk offiring activist judges, Wash.
Post, Apr. 11, 2005, at A19 (referring to judges who "have been busying themselves, as critics see it, with
promoting same-sex marriage and censoring the Ten Commandments," and who "'have decided to to off on
their own tangent and disobey statutes of the United States of America') (quoting Sen. Rick Santorum (R-
Pa.)).
215 Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988). As a general jurisprudential matter,
"formalism" encompasses "the concept of decisionmaking according to rule. Formalism is the way in which
rules achieve their 'ruleness' precisely by doing what is supposed to be the failing of formalism: screening off
from a decisionmaker factors that a sensitive decisionmaker would otherwise take into account." Id.
216 See, e.g., Peter J. Smith, The Sources of Federalism: Federalists, Anti-Federalists, and the Court's
Quest for Original Meaning, GEO. WASH. U.L. ScH. PuB. L. & LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER No. 70, at
13-14, available at http://ssm.com/abstract-436583 (last visited Nov. 1, 2004) ("Originalism is a theory of
constitutional interpretation that assigns dispositive weight to the original understanding of the Constitution or
the constitutional provision at issue. Originalism thus requires that a provision of the Constitution be
interpreted as it was understood when it was drafted and ratified, not according to the different meaning that
subsequent generations have ascribed to it.").
217 See, e.g., SCALIA, Common-Law Courts, supra note 50, at 49 (criticizing as antidemocratic the
nonoriginalist argument that flexibility in constitutional interpretation is necessary to adapt the Constitution to
societal change); see also Smith, supra note 216, at 16-18 (providing a succinct summary and review of these
arguments).,




argue, constrain the personal ideological preferences of individual (liberal)
judges. 219
The argument for formalism ignores a multitude of problems. With respect
to balancing, formalism ignores that interest-balancing avoids the injustices in
individual cases to which rigid adherence to "the rules laid down" inevitably
leads. Indeed, formalism in constitutional interpretation seems peculiarly ill-
suited to a common law country like the United States, in which judges
generally rely on the authority of history, tradition, and precedent to decide
cases on the basis of practical wisdom rather than deductive logic.
220
With respect to originalism, practical difficulties include ascertaining and
applying the substantive as well as the semantic understanding of a
constitutional provision in a way that operates to constrain contemporary
221judges. Originalism also entails the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of
accurately ascertaining the meaning of texts and events anchored in the distant
past, of restating the original understanding in such a way that it is both true to
history and relevant to contemporary issues, and of determining how to apply
the original understanding to contemporary situations which the founding
generation did not even imagine.222  To the extent that countermajoritarian
arguments are directed at the judiciary's articulation of unenumerated
constitutional rights through, for example, expansive interpretations of the Due
219 See, e.g., BORK, supra note 211, at 143-45, 155, 262-65, 351-55; see also Rosenfeld, supra note 48,
at 1313, 1334 (observing that this version of countermajoritarian argument implicitly relies on the classical
liberal preference for the "rule of law" against the "rule of men," by casting formalist constitutional rules in the
ostensibly principled former role, and activist judges in the allegedly arbitrary latter one).
220 Cospare Rosenfeld, supra note 48, at 1336 (arguing that the formalist account of the rule of law is
undermined in the common law tradition by "the tension between the need for legal certainty and predictability
and the common law's experimental and incremental approach," and by the "great latitude enjoyed by
common law judges prone to blurring the distinction between law making and judicial interpretation."), with
SCALIA, Common-Law Courts, supra note 50, at 39 (criticizing the common law mentality as recognizing no
boundaries on the extent to which judges may inject their personal preferences into the process of
constitutional interpretation).
221 See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 216
(1980) ("What of instances where the adopters' substantive intent was indeterminate-where even if they had
adverted to a proposed application they would not have been certain how the clause should apply? Here it is
plausible that if they had a determinate interpretive intent--they intended to delegate to future
decisionmakers the authority to apply the clause in light of the general principles underlying it.").
222 Id. at 218 (arguing that an originalist must "immerse herself in the world of the adopters to try to
understand constitutional concepts and values from their perspective.... ascertain the adopters' interpretive
intent and the intended scope of the provision in question.... [and] 'translate' the adopters' concepts and
intentions into our time and apply them to situations that the adopters did not foresee."); see also JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 11-41 (1980) (arguing that a "clause-bound
interpretivism" is impossible).
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Process Clauses, such arguments ignore the long common law tradition of
recognizing natural and "fundamental" rights against government, a tradition
codified in state "law of the land" as well as the federal Due Process
Clauses.223 Open-textured language in the provisions like the Due Process
Clauses seems to invite, if not altogether to require, judicial construction of
unenumerated rights.224
More fundamentally, the conclusion that judicial review is "deviant"
ignores the rights-based critiques of the "tyranny of the majority," which
maintain that the Western political ideal is not "democracy" simpliciter, but
"liberal" or "constitutional" democracy, that is, democratic rule limited by
judicially enforced protection of human rights. In constitutional democracy,
judicial examination of legislation and other majoritarian actions to ensure
constitutionality is not deviant, but indispensable.
Finally, it is doubtful that even the most conscientious originalist judge can
construct from such indeterminate and open-textured provisions stable and
specific rules of decision that are sufficient to decide concrete cases.' It is
223 Compare JOHN ORTH, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY (2003) (tracing the historical basis for
the argument that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and "law of the land"
clauses of state constitutions referred to judicial recognition and enforcement of natural and fundamental rights
and powers at common law) with SCALIA, Common-Law Courts, supra note 50, at 24 ("[I]t may or may not be
a good thing to guarantee additional liberties [by means of the Due Process Clause] but the Due Process
Clause quite obviously does not bear that interpretation. By its inescapable terms, it guarantees only
process.").
224 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. I ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States."); id. amend. VIII (prohibiting infliction of "'cruel and unusual
punishments"); id. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people."); id. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
225 RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 7
(1996) ("Many [constitutional] clauses are drafted in exceedingly abstract moral language ... According to the
moral reading, these clauses must be understood in the way their language most naturally suggests: they refer
to abstract moral principles and incorporate these by reference, as limits on government's power."); see also
Rosenfeld, supra note 48, at 1339:
Many key constitutional provisions, such as the "due process" and the "equal protection"
guarantees contained in the American Constitution are stated generally and at a high level of
abstraction. This allows for a wide range of plausible interpretations, and common law trained
judges, who have dealt with such constitutional provisions, have widely differed in their




equally unclear that the original meaning extracted from even a relatively
specific constitutional text possesses the objective character required for the
bloodless resolution of constitutional controversies that formalism exalts.
226
The pre-Smith religious exemption doctrine was an example of the activist
Warren Court balancing methodology criticized by formalists. The exemption
doctrine emerged in the 1960s, in the midst of a revolutionary expansion of
constitutional liberties protected by the Speech and Press Clauses of the First
Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.22' The
doctrine empowered courts to excuse individuals from complying with a law
upon their showing that the law burdened sincere religious practices, unless the
government could show in its turn that mandating uniform obedience to the
law was required by a compelling interest that could not be protected in any
less intrusive manner. In terms of balancing methodology, the exemption
doctrine presumed, at least in theory, that the right to the free exercise of
religion burdened by a law nearly always outweighed the government's
legitimate interests in uniform enforcement, although in practice the Court
rejected most exemption claims. 228  As the Smith majority characterized the
matter, the exemption doctrine permitted any person to obtain disposition to
disobey the law, to become a "law unto himself," merely by asserting that a
particular government action burdened that person's religious beliefs or
practices, even though the burden was incidental rather than intentional.229
The exemption doctrine permits, indeed, it requires, judges to weigh legislative
Id.; ELY, supra note 222, at 11-41 (arguing that the "open-textured" provisions of the Constitution make a
"clause-bound" interpretivism impossible); James E. Fleming, Fidelity, Basic Liberties, and the Specter of
Lochner, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 147, 153 (1999) (arguing that the Constitution sets forth "abstract moral
principles" rather than "historical rules and practices").
226 See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, Conservatives, Liberals, Romantics: The Persistent Quest for
Certainty in Constitutional Interpretation, 50 VAND. L. REV. 613 (1997) (arguing on the basis of Gadamerian
hermeneutics that recovery of a stable and objective original meaning is impossible in principle); see also
Brest, supra note 221, at 221-22 ("There is a hermeneutic tradition ... which holds that we can never
understand the past in its own terms, free from our prejudices or preconceptions. We are hopelessly
imprisoned in our own world-views; we can shed some preconceptions only to adopt others, with no reason to
believe that they are the conceptions of the different society that we are trying to understand."); Smith, supra
note 216, at 19-22 (providing a succinct summary and review of the various criticisms of originalism).
227 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (holding that in balancing the state's interest in
denying exemptions for Sabbatarians against the claimant's interest in religious liberty, "[it is basic that no
showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive
constitutional area, '[olnly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible
limitation."') (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
228 See, e.g., Thomas, 323 U.S. at 516.
229 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 885.
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and regulatory interests in uniform enforcement against intrusions upon
individual religious liberty resulting from enforcement: a task that properly
belongs to the legislature, and not the judiciary. 23  The reach of the doctrine
might have been limited by its application only to significant burdens on
central religious beliefs, or by a rigorous inquiry into the sincerity of the
claimant, but these would have required the Supreme Court to make
theological judgments about the importance of particular religious beliefs and
practices in the lives of believers, an equally unsatisfactory result.
231
The Smith decision, then, can be understood as an instance of conservative
reaction to the countermajoritarian difficulty. 232  As the number of political
conservatives appointed to the Court mounted, support for the exemption
doctrine waned. The Court repeatedly revisited the exemption doctrine during
the 1980s, 233 until it finally abandoned the doctrine in Smith in 1990.234 The
majority opinion in Smith was written by Justice Scalia, an avowed opponent
of both broad readings of individual rights235 and balancing methodology,
236
237
and a champion of legislative prerogative. 23 So long as political conservatives
hold the balance of power on the Supreme Court, the religious exemption
doctrine is unlikely to return.
230 Id. at 887.
231 Id. at 890.
232 See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 58, at 190-91. McConnell noted that "[tihe real logic of the Smith
decision has to do with institutional roles":
Smith indicates that it is a decision about institutional arrangements more than about substantive
merits. A significant portion of the Court's justification focuses on the difficulties that courts
encounter in balancing interests in the fashion required by the pre-Smith law. The opinion
suggests that only the political branches possess the requisite competence and authority to make
these judgments .... [I]n other words, the Smith Court consciously decided to give less than full
protection to free exercise in order to protect legislative prerogative.
Id. (quoting Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 VA. L. REV. 1, 59 (1993)).
233 See, e.g., Frazee v. Ill. Dept. of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450
U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Vemner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (Free Exercise Clause precludes denial of
unemployment benefits to person who leaves or loses employment for reasons of religious conscience).
234 494 U.S. at 872.
235 E.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion) (arguing that individual
constitutional rights should be articulated and applied at "the most specific level at which a relevant tradition
protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified.").
236 E.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 579-80 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (rejecting the
proposition that conduct regulations must be justified by an "important or substantial" government interest).
237 E.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, Response, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 50,
at 129-33 (disputing that the Anglo-American common law tradition included judicial power to overrule or to
ignore acts of Parliament or colonial or state legislatures).
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Formalism may also exert a tempering influence on the development of
post-Smith free exercise doctrine. The principal question posed to judges by
the expansive interpretation of "general applicability" is whether religious
conduct that is not exempted from a law would, if exempted, undermine the
purposes of the law to the same extent as already exempt secular conduct.
238
This necessitates a kind of judicial balancing: although the judge does not
directly balance the religious liberty interest against the state regulatory
interest, he or she must still assess the strength of the government interest, as
implied by the number of secular exemptions, as well as weigh the extent to
which exempted secular interests resemble nonexempt religious interests.
239
Since avoidance of balancing was one of the justifications for Smith's
abandonment of religious exemptions and its revival of formal equality, courts
may be reticent to embrace expansive constructions of general applicability in
applying the General Rule.
B. The Return of Judicially Enforced Federalism
It is a commonplace that one of the innovative aspects of the U.S.
Constitution is its strategy of protecting individual liberty by dividing national
240sovereignty between the national government and the states. Under the so-
called doctrine of "limited" or "enumerated" powers, the Constitution invests
the national government with supreme governing authority pursuant to the
Supremacy Clause, 241 but limits the exercise of that authority by restricting
Congress to the exercise of those powers specifically "enumerated" in the
Constitution as having been delegated to Congress, 242 such as the power to
regulate interstate commerce. 243  The Tenth Amendment confirms that the
238 See discussion supra Part VI.A.2.
239 See Christopher C. Lund, A Matter of Constitutional Luck: The General Applicability Requirement in
Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 26 HARv. J. L. & PuB. POL'Y 627, 664 (2003) ("Judges still balance factors after
Smith just as much as they did before it-that is evident every time a judge tries to determine whether a
religious exception does as much harm to the legislature's rule as an existing secular exception.").
240 See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 316 (2003).
241 U.S. CONST. art. V|, cl. 2.
242 U.S. CONST. art. I, § I ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States...") (emphasis added). The enumerated powers doctrine has traditionally been thought to have
less force in the context of Executive powers, because the Constitution's allocation of power to the President is
not by its terms limited to the powers expressly enumerated in Article II, as Congress's power is expressly
limited by the powers enumerated in Article I. See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested
in a President of the United States of America.").
243 Id. art. I., § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce... among the several
States...").
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states retained all sovereign powers not enumerated in the Constitution as
having been delegated to the national government or prohibited to the states.24
The enumerated powers doctrine was compromised virtually from the
outset. The Framers included among the enumerated powers of Congress the
additional power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper" for
exercise of the other powers delegated to Congress, as well as the powers
delegated to other officers and branches of the national government. 245 Another
formative opinion by Chief Justice Marshall in the early nineteenth century
construed this Necessary and Proper Clause broadly, as having granted to
Congress the power to take any action that might reasonably be thought
"helpful" or "convenient" to the exercise of one of its enumerated powers,
rather than narrowly, as the power to take only such actions as would be
absolutely necessary to the exercise of such a power.246  If, in addition to its
expressly enumerated powers, Congress may properly exercise all
unenumerated powers that are merely useful-rather than necessary-to the
exercise of the enumerated ones, then Congress's power extends in fact far
beyond the boundaries set in theory by the enumerated powers doctrine.
247
The Supreme Court's federalism decisions over the centuries since ratification
reflect this tension between the enumerated powers doctrine and the broad
construction of the Necessary and Proper Clause, having oscillated between
judicial enforcement of strict limitations on national power, on the one hand,
and judicial abdication of such enforcement to the political branches, on the
other.
24 8
244 Id. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 45
(James Madison).
245 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ("The Congress shall have the Power... To make all Laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States or in any Department or Officer thereof.").
246 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
247 See, e.g., Robert F. Nagel, Judicial Power and the Restoration of Federalism, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. Scl. 52, 55 (2001) ("[How can the Court convincingly explain that a statute is beyond the
constitutional power of Congress when the Constitution itself, making no distinction between direct and
indirect consequences, expressly allows control over any activity thought to be necessary and proper for the
regulation of commerce?").
248 See id. at 55 (arguing that the federalism doctrine is necessarily incoherent because the Constitution
requires the Court to pursue the mutually exclusive objectives of limiting congressional power pursuant to the
enumerated powers theory and expanding congressional power under the Necessary and Proper Clause); see
also Lupu, Why Congress Was Wrong, supra note 189, at 812 (observing that judicial review and the
Necessary and Proper Clause "have always been in quiet tension with one another. Marbury declares that the
[Supreme] Court has the power to determine the meaning of the Constitution as law. McCulloch declares that
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The largest number of federalism disputes between the national
government and the states have focused on the proper limits of congressional
exercises of power under the Commerce Clause, and disputes over the reach of
the commerce power thus provide an accurate illustration of broader
federalism themes and questions through constitutional history. The first
constructions of the commerce power by the Supreme Court were actually
quite broad. A dictum in yet another of Chief Justice Marshall's influential
decisions stated that the commerce power is both plenary and exclusive to
Congress. 249
Early Congresses made little affirmative use of this broad construction of
the commerce power. Most of the early questions surrounding the commerce
power involved, not the constitutionality of congressional action under the
Commerce Clause, but rather the constitutionality of state laws that burdened
interstate commercial activities that Congress had not seen fit to regulate.
250
Under the so-called "dormant" commerce power, 251 early decisions of the
Supreme Court held that states cannot impose excessive or undue burdens on
interstate commerce even when their laws do not conflict with federal law
because Congress has not acted in the area.
2
the Congress, not the Court, possesses enormous discretion to choose the means necessary to bring about the
ends entrusted to the Congress by the Constitution.").
249 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 196-97 (1824). In Gibbons, the Court held that the commerce
power,
like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution.... If, as has always
been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to
those objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, is
vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government ....
id.; see also TRIBE 2000, supra note 45, § 5-4, at 808 (reading Gibbons as having argued that "congressional
power to regulate 'commercial intercourse' extended to all commercial activity having any interstate
component or impact-however indirect... This power would be plenary: absolute within its sphere, subject
only to the Constitution's affirmative prohibitions on the exercise of federal authority.").
250 See, e.g., PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 133, 355 (4th ed.
2000).
251 See TRIBE 2000, supra note 45, § 2-8, at 203, 1030. The dormant comnerce power is Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause to protect interstate commerce from burdensome state regulation by wholly
or partially prohibiting state regulation of interstate commerce. An especially strong description of the
dormant commerce power was set forth by Justice Johnson in Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 227. In a concurring
opinion, Justice Johnson stated, "since the power to prescribe the limits to [the commerce power] necessarily
implies the power to determine what shall remain unrestrained, it follows that the power must be exclusive; it
can reside but in one potentate; and hence, the grant of this power carries with it the whole subject, leaving
nothing for the State to act upon." Id.
252 See, e.g., Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245, 252 (1829) (holding that state law
authorizing construction of bridge across navigable stream did not violate the Commerce Clause because the
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It was not until the widespread industrialization of the American economy
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with its accompanying
social disclocations,253 that Congress began regularly to assert its affirmative
power to regulate interstate commerce.254 The question of how to protect the
sovereign prerogatives of the states against aggressive congressional assertions
of this power took on additional urgency with the abolishment in 1913 of state
legislative appointment of senators in favor of their popular election.255 In a
development that paralleled its elaboration of substantive rights under the Due
Process Clause to counter progressive social welfare legislation, the Supreme
Court during this period developed a theory of "dual federalism" that sought to
restrict the encroachment of the national government on the reserved powers of
the states by positing separate spheres of sovereignty for each of the national
government and the states, and assigning regulatory power over various private
activities wholly to one sphere or the other.
256
With respect to the Commerce Clause, the Court sought to confine the
reach of the commerce power under dual federalism by restricting the
definition of "commerce" to the interstate marketing of finished goods. Under
this approach, manufacturing, mining, agriculture, and other production
law was not "repugnant to the [congressional] power to regulate commerce in its dormant state, or... in
conflict with any [federal] law passed on the subject."); Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 209-11 (arguing that the
commerce power is exclusive to Congress, but that the states may regulate commerce incidentally pursuant to
the exercise of their reserved powers, such as the taxing and police powers, so long as these do not excessively
burden interstate commerce or conflict with affirmative congressional regulation of such commerce); see also
Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 319 (1851) (holding that Congress's commerce power is exclusive and
occupies the field when the objects of the power "are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform
system, or plan of regulation," but further providing that the states may regulate commerce concurrently with
the national government under their reserved powers where the objects of state regulation are essentially
local).
253 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 70, at 175 (observing that one of the common
denominators of public policy during the Progressive era was the "belief that the time had come to deal with
some of the more chaotic and unjust aspects of a mature industrial society" and to "bring public policy (and the
nation's political and governing institutions) into closer accord with new social and economic realities").
254 See BREST ET AL., supra note 250, at 356-57.
255 U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, cl. I ("Tbe Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators
from each State, elected by the people thereof...").
256 TRIBE 2000, supra note 45, § 5-11, at 862 (defining "dual federalism" as a theory of federalism under
which each of the national and state governments was thought to occupy an "independent, inviolable, and fully
co-equal sphere[]" with neither government having the power to intrude upon the sphere occupied by the
other); AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 70, at 235 (noting that dual federalism "postulated
the existence of rigid constitutional boundaries separating appropriate federal activities from those reserved
exclusively to the states").
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activities were placed beyond the reach of Congress's commerce power. 257
Although the products, ore, and crops produced by these activities usually
required tools, supplies, and materials that were purchased in interstate
markets, that were often bound for interstate markets, or that were a significant
component of the national economy, the Court deemed such activities a merely
"indirect" influence on interstate commerce that was consequently beyond
Congress's power to regulate under dual federalism.2
58
This period also saw references to the Tenth Amendment as an independent
check on the exercise of enumerated congressional powers. By its terms, the
Tenth Amendment merely confirms the enumerated powers doctrine-that is,
it emphasizes that all powers not delegated to the national government by the
Constitution are retained by the states. 259  The Amendment has been read,
however, as an expression of a broader understanding of state sovereignty
under the Constitution, pursuant to which the states do not merely possess the
residuum of powers not delegated to the national government, but also the
power affirmatively to resist encroachments on state sovereignty and
prerogatives by the national government's exercise of its enumerated
powers. 26  During its dual federalism period, the Court suggested the second,
broader construction under which the Tenth Amendment implies that the states
possess an independent check on the otherwise proper exercise of
257 E.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 301-04 (1936) (holding that the commerce power does
not extend to mining and other production, but only to trade in the ore and goods thereby produced); United
States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1895) (holding that the commerce power does not extend to the
manufacture of goods, but only to trade in such goods following their manufacture).
258 See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918) (holding that Congress may not use the
commerce power to regulate indirectly activities that it lacks the power to regulate directly); Bailey v. Drexel
Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 39-40 (1922) (invalidating use of taxing power to regulate the use of child labor,
as an attempt to regulate indirectly that which Congress lacked the power to regulate directly).
259 See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) ("The [Tenth] amendment states but a
truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered."); see also TRIBE 2000, supra note 45, § 5-11, at
860 (observing that the Court generally treated the Tenth Amendment, "not as expressing an independent
constraint on federal power, but simply as stating the corollary to the proposition that federal power is indeed
limited.").
260 E.g., Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547-48 n.7 (1975) ("The [Tenth] Amendment expressly
declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States'
integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system."); see Matthew D. Adler, State Sovereignty
and the Anti-Commandeering Cases, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC., 158, 160-61 (2001) ("A
particularly robust scheme of state sovereignty" would authorize federal courts "to invalidate a federal statute
that was unsupported by any power constitutionally granted to the national government or that was supported
by some such power but nonetheless violated a state sovereignty constraint."); see also Nagel, supra note 247,
at 56 (observing that the founders "went so far as to envision the possibility of armed encounters between the
national army and state militias") (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison)).
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congressional powers. 26 1  Under this construction, for example, the Tenth
Amendment is evidence of an implied limit on Congress's exercise of the
commerce power, even in cases in which such exercise falls well within the
recognized boundaries of the commerce power or some other enumerated
congressional power.
262
Like the Court's use of the Due Process Clause to invalid state social
welfare legislation for encroachment on unenumerated substantive rights, its
narrow construction of the Commerce Clause and its suggestion of
independent limits on congressional power under the Tenth Amendment
decisions generated strong and persistent criticism from Congress, which
viewed the Court in all these contexts has having usurped state and
congressional prerogatives in the guise of interpreting the Constitution. This
criticism reached its height during the Great Depression in the 1930s, as the
Court repeatedly struck down as beyond Congress's commerce power federal
statutory programs designed to stimulate production and employment and
otherwise to alleviate the desperate economic circumstances in which the
United States found itself during these times. 263  Under tremendous political264
pressure, the Court finally abandoned its formalistic Commerce Clause and
nascent Tenth Amendment jurisprudence in 1937, together with the dual
federalism theory which underwrote them.265
From 1937 to 1995, the Court effectively abdicated judicial review of
congressional exercises of the commerce power, leaving the task of policing
261 See e.g., Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
262 See TRIBE 2000, supra note 45, § 5-11, at 861; see also Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,
845 (1976) ("We have repeatedly recognized that there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state
government which may not be impaired by Congress, not because Congress may lack an affirmative grant of
legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority
in that manner."), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
263 E.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (Bituminous Coal Conservation Act); A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (FTC Code of Fair Competition for Live Poultry Industry
for New York City); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (National Industrial Recovery Act);
see AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 70, at 232-33.
264 See AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 70, at 241 (describing President Roosevelt's
"Court-packing" plan).
265 E.g., Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (upholding federal tax incentive for creation of
state unemployment compensation funds against Tenth Amendment challenge); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Co., 301 U.S. 22, 31 (1937) (defining "interstate commerce" as interstate traffic, transactions,
transportation, and communication, and "affecting [interstate] commerce" as being in the flow of commerce
among the states or "burdening or obstructing [interstate] commerce" or such flow, and upholding power of
Congress to regulate labor relations under the Commerce Clause because strikes and industrial strife exert a
serious effect on interstate commerce); see TRIBE 2000, supra note 45, § 5-11, at 862-63; AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 70, at 233, 235.
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the boundaries of the Commerce Clause and safeguarding the prerogatives of
the states entirely to the political process. 266  The Court repeatedly held that
Congress could regulate (a) any use of the channels of interstate commerce,
such as interstate highways, navigable rivers, and telephone and other
electronic communications lines; 267  (b) any instrumentality of interstate
commerce, such as a corporation that uses the channels of interstate commerce,
and any person or thing that moves in interstate commerce; 268 and, most
controversially, (c) any activity whose cumulative effects might conceivably
affect interstate commerce. 269 The Court so routinely deferred to congressional
findings that a federal law substantially affected interstate commerce that the
Court largely ceased to find facts at all in this regard, relying instead on
conclusory and unsupported assertions of such an effect.270 Given the dramatic
breadth of the commerce power under these "tests," it is hardly surprising that
during this period the Court failed to find a single congressional act
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.
27 1
The "substantial effects" test was particularly expansive. Because of the
national breadth and interdependence of commercial markets in the mid-
twentieth century, 272 the power to regulate any activity with a conceivable
effect on interstate commerce, as provided by the substantial effects test, is the
power to regulate virtually any activity in the United States. The substantial
effects test, together with the historically broad reading of the Necessary and
Proper Clause, effectively converted the commerce power into an all-purpose
266 See generally JESSE CHOPER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980).
267 E.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (holding that the commerce power encompasses the
interstate shipment of goods, as well as the regulation of wholly intrastate activities, such as the manufacture
of goods for interstate shipment, whose relationship to interstate commerce is sufficiently close that Congress
must regulate them in order to effectively regulate interstate commerce).
268 E.g., Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969) (applying federal desegregation laws to private recreation
area because it served interstate travelers with food that had moved in interstate commerce).
269 E.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 3!7 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that Congress may penalize under the
commerce power the cultivation of small amounts of wheat for personal consumption by a farmer receiving
payments for non-cultivation of wheat, on ground that similar cultivation by every farmer receiving non-
cultivation payments would depress demand for wheat in interstate commercial markets, and thus could
conceivably effect a substantial influence on interstate commerce).
270 E.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995) (observing that neither the Gun-Free School
Zones Act nor its legislative history contained congressional findings on the extent to which gun possession in
the vicinity of a school impacted interstate commerce).
271 See AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 70, at 242-43.
272 See id. at 244-45.
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federal police power that enabled Congress to regulate even noncommercial
activities under the Commerce Clause.
The last decade has seen the revival of efforts by the Court to articulate
judicially administrable limits on the commerce power, and to re-enlist the
Tenth Amendment and federalism generally as additional limits on that
274power. Although the Court has left untouched Congress's broad
presumptive power to regulate the channels and instrumentalities of interstate
commerce and all persons and things that move in interstate commerce, 27, it
has substantially reduced the reach of the substantial effects test. The Court
now insists that Congress set forth specific legislative findings that
demonstrate that the activity that Congress seeks to regulate pursuant to its
commerce power constitutes "economic activity" that exerts a direct and
substantial effect on interstate commerce.276  Even when Congress can
273 E.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding federal statutory prohibition on
segregation in family owned restaurant because of the cumulative affect on commerce of the procurement of
supplies from out-of-state by this and similar segregated restaurants, and of the artificial constriction of
African American customer demand imposed by such segregation); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding federal statutory prohibition on segregation in public accommodations on
ground that segregation has a disruptive affect on interstate travel by African Americans); see Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 564 (observing that in defending an expansive view of the commerce power the dissent denied that
contemporary Commerce Clause doctrine authorized a "general federal police power," but was "unable to
identify any activity that the States may regulate but Congress may not."); see AMERICAN CONSTITUrIONAL
HISTORY, supra note 70, at 235 (noting that during this period "three seemed to be no constitutional limitation
upon the authority of Congress to regulate interstate commerce and to tax and spend on behalf of the general
welfare, even where these federal efforts intruded deeply into areas of social and economic life traditionally
left to the states"); id. at 243-44:
Once the distinctions between interstate movement and production and between "direct" and
"indirect" effects upon interstate commerce are rejected, the number of links in the chain of cause
and effect becomes irrelevant. Federal power would reach to the local machine shop that
repaired the chain saws that cut the trees that yielded the pulp wood that yielded the pulp that
made the paper bought by the publisher to print the newspaper that circulated in interstate
commerce. The size of the particular establishment or transaction also became irrelevant, for the
cumulative effect of many small local activities might have a major impact upon interstate
commerce.
Id.
274 See, e.g., John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1312-13
(1997) (noting the "[riesurrection of judicial review in federalism cases" and its applicability to "questions
concerning state sovereignty and the proper balance between the national and state governments."); see also
Garnett, supra note 207, at 18-39 (providing a succinct summary and review of these developments).
275 See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
276 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000). In Morrison, the Court held that congressional
creation of private right of action for sexual assault fell outside the commerce power because
[glender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.
While we need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic
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demonstrate such a direct effect, however, the Court will nevertheless find the
action beyond the commerce power if it is not economic and additionally
encroaches upon areas whose regulation has traditionally been left to the
277
states. Finally, the Court has stated that a substantial effect on interstate
commerce may not be demonstrated by cumulating instances and occurrences
of non-economic activity which Congress seeks to regulate. 278 The substantial
effects test, in other words, may be now employed only to measure the
constitutionality of commerce power regulations of economic activity.
In tandem with its re-imposition of judicially enforceable limits on
Congress's commerce power, the Court has also reinvigorated Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence. In 1976, the Court struck down the imposition of
federal wage and hour regulations on municipal employees, observing that the
constitutional policy declared by the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress
from exercising power "in a fashion that would impair the States' 'ability to
function effectively in a federal system."' 279 After a brief interlude in which it
appeared to have abandoned the notion of independent structural limits on
federal power,28 the Court turned to the Tenth Amendment yet again, holding
in successive cases that the federalist structure of the Constitution, whose
activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in our Nation's history our cases have upheld
Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature.
Id.; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (holding that law prohibiting possession of handguns in the vicinity of a school
falls outside of the commerce power because it is a "criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with
'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms," and is not "an
essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut
unless the intrastate activity were regulated."); id. at 563 (holding that specific congressional findings are
necessary for a court to "evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected
interstate commerce even though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye ...."); see also id. at
565-66 ("We do not doubt that Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate numerous
commercial activities that substantially affect interstate commerce and also affect the educational process.").
277 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615 (expressing concern that expansive constructions of the commerce power
would "completely obliterate the Constitution's distinction between national and local authority" permitting
Congress to legislate in "areas of traditional state regulation," such as "marriage, divorce, and
childrearing .... ); see also Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976) (concluding that when
congressional actions "directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of
traditional governmental functions, they are not within the authority granted Congress" by the Commerce
Clause).
278 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615 (rejecting the use of "but-for" causation to establish that a regulated activity
substantially affects interstate commerce, on ground that such a weak causal theory provides no effective
limits on the commerce power); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (rejecting use of a "view of causation" that "pile[s]
inference upon inference" to show a substantial effect on interstate commerce).
279 Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547).
280 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 528 (overruling Nat'l League of Cities).
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overriding importance is declared by the Tenth Amendment, 281 precludes
Congress from imposing upon the states laws or regulations that interfere with
their fundamental governing and law-making powers, even when Congress has
acted within the bounds of an enumerated congressional power.
282
The revival of federalism has influenced Religion Clause doctrine in at
least two respects. First, it coincided with the move to neutrality in Religion
Clause doctrine. The demise of the exemption doctrine under the Free
Exercise Clause and the retreat from separationism under the Establishment
Clause have together permitted "more variation, experimentation, and
accommodation" of religious interests by cities and states, 283 one can hardly
ignore the possibility, if not the likelihood, that the Court's concern for
federalism was at least one significant influence on Religion Clause doctrine
during the last generation.
Second, although Smith purports to approve religious exemptions when
enacted by Congress or the state legislatures, congressionally mandated
exemptions may violate the Court's new federalism doctrines. Federal
legislation that is protective of religious free exercise frequently interferes with
state powers and prerogatives. This was one of the motivations for the Court's
determination that RFRA was an "incongruent" and "disproportionate"
response to the infrequent occurrence of overt religious discrimination in the
284United States. RLUIPA represents a similarly substantial intrusion on statepower. Both land-use and incarceration of state-law violators have long been
281 In New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992), the Court noted:
The Tenth Amendment... restrains the power of Congress, but this limit is not derived from the
text of the Tenth Amendment itself, which ... is essentially a tautology. Instead, the Tenth
Amendment confirms that the power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a
given instance, reserve power to the States.
Id.
282 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that the enumerated powers doctrine and the
federalist structure of the Constitution preclude Congress from compelling state officers to enforce federal
laws); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that the federalist structure of the
Constitution, which presupposes that Congress's enumerated powers shall be used to act upon individuals
rather than upon the states, precludes Congress from compelling state legislatures to enact, to enforce, or to
administer federal regulatory programs); see also Adler, supra note 260, at 163-64 (synthesizing New York
and Printz as supporting the general principle that Congress may not enact federal statutes that coerce state
legislative and executive officers into the performance of affirmative duties).
283 Garnett, supra note 212, at 24.
284 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 509 (1997).
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285thought the proper subject of the state police power, and the regulation of
prisons that detain those who have been convicted of violating state law is also
one of those quintessential sovereign state functions of which the Court has
been particularly solicitous under its revitalized Tenth Amendment doctrine.
286
Congress also relied on the substantial effects test under the Commerce Clause
as one basis of its assertion of power to prohibit incidental burdens on religious
exercise in land-use and prison contexts, though religious worship is clearly
not economic activity, and many of the effects on interstate commerce
stemming from governmental burdens on religious exercise appear to be less
"direct" than the Court purports to require. The Court's concern for
federalism, therefore, may well influence it to strike portions of RLUIPA as
either beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause, or as an
excessive intrusion upon traditional and quintessential state functions under the
Tenth Amendment.2 87
3. Equality and the Erosion of Traditional Religion
There is little doubt that formal equality is the the dominant value in
Religion Clause jurisprudence 288 and in American constitutional law generally.
I have already discussed how formal equality has overtaken other values that
formerly governed the Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses. Similar
trends are also evident in the Speech Clause.
At the same time, the United States has seen significant alterations in the
nature and influence of religion. For many years, sociologists and religious
studies scholars argued that Americans would inevitably abandon religious
belief in the face of epistemological challenges by history, philosophy, science,
and other secular disciplines. 289  Though secular forces have indeed
285 See Hamilton, supra note 240, at 335 (observing that "[lhand use law has always been a creature of
state and local law." This principal has been recognized by the Supreme Court).
286 Id. at 341 ("A state's sovereignty is particularly implicated where the issue is enforcement of its own
criminal laws and the execution of the relevant punishment.").
287 See Part Il.C supra.
288 For accounts of the move to equality, see Dan Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From
the Original Theology to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1 (2000); Noah Feldman,
From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 90 CAL. L. REV. 673 (2002); see
also Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional Order, 47
VILL. L. REV. 37, 66-72 (2002).
289 See, e.g., William H. Swatos, Jr. & Kevin J. Christiano, Secularization Theory: The Course of a
Concept, 60 Soc. OF RELIGION 209, 214 (1999) (defining "secularization theory," as the claim that, "in the
face of scientific rationality, religion's influence on all aspects of life-from personal habits to social
institutions-is in dramatic decline").
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undermined many claims of the traditional theistic religions, 290 the
"secularization hypothesis" itself proved to be false,29' and researchers in the
United States have largely abandoned it.
29 2
Religious pluralism has proven far more potent than secularization in its
effects on religious belief. The last half of the twentieth century saw an
explosion of diversity in American religious beliefs and practices. This
expansion of religious difference in the United States has been fueled by
growth in a dramatically diverse range of denominations, sects, and religious
communities, including new and break-off fundamentalist and evangelical
denominations; so-called "Christian alternative" churches like Christian
Science and the Jehovah's Witnesses; traditional African-American churches
and non-indigenous African religions like the Santeria, Rastafarianism, and
Voudou; eastern immigrant religions like Islam, Buddhism, the Bahai, the
Sikhs, and Hinduism; new religions like Scientology and Eckankar; and so-
293
called "New Age" spirituality. As Professor Conkle has observed, "the
diversity of the American religious experience is ever more extraordinary, and
the diversity of thought within the traditional faiths is ever more
pronounced.294
The pressure of radical religious pluralism is eroding the claims of the
traditional denominations to ultimate or absolute truth. 95 Contemporary
290 See, e.g., Magarian, supra note 22, at 1985 ("The last two centuries have brought developments in
philosophy and the natural sciences that have scattered Americans' spiritual and conscientious commitments
far beyond the range of traditional, theistic beliefs.").
291 Rebecca French, Shopping for Religion: The Change in Everyday Religious Practice and Its
Importance to the Law, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 127, 161, 192 (2003); David N. Geliner, Studying Secularism,
Practising Secularism Anthropological Imperatives Personal Values and Professional Evaluations, 9 Soc.
ANTHROPOLOGY 337,337 (2001).
292 See, e.g., id. at 160; Peter L. Berger, Reflections on the Sociology of Religion Today, 62 Soc. OF
RELIGION 443,444 (2001).
293 French, supra note 291, at 142-43.
294 Conkle, supra note 288, at 30.
295 Swatos & Christiano, supra note 289, at 221:
[E]ver-increasing pluralism does undermine the element of absolute certainty that has been
claimed by at least some religions.., competing in a marketplace-like setting, the harder it
becomes to assert that any one religion contains all truth and that others must be all wrong.
While it is certainly possible to make "better" or "worse" type comparisons, all-or-nothing
rigidity simply does not hold up.
Id.; see, e.g., Berger, supra note 292, at 449 ("Modernity pluralizes the lifeworlds of individuals and
consequently undermines all taken-for-granted certainties.") (emphasis omitted); see also BARBARA
HARGROVE, THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES 126-27 (1979)
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religious practice in the United States seems to be evolving away from its
traditional focus on the means of salvation and an account of how the world is,
was, and will be, towards a means of coping "with the vicissitudes of
,,296contemporary life. Many Americans, for example, now "shop" for
churches like they do for consumer goods, choosing one because of the
personal preferences and needs that it meets, rather than the truth-claims that it
makes.29 7
A related and growing phenomenon is so-called "grocery-cart religion," in
which an individual assembles her own personal collection of beliefs and
practices, picking and choosing from among diverse and even incompatible
denominations and traditions. 298  This erosion of denominational and
(observing that ecumenicism was one of the first responses of Christianity to post-Christian religious
pluralism).
296 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 288, at 67; see also HARGROVE, supra note 288, at 128. Hargrove noted:
The church of historic religion held and dispensed the "means of grace" through which the
individual might attain salvation and without which that salvation was in jeopardy. The sect of
early modem religion had the power to certify one's status as a member of the elect and exercised
the power of moral sanctions over its members. In modem religion, however, the individual is
the focus and the exerciser of power. Salvation is likely to be defined in terms of "self-
actualization" and religion treated as a useful tool in achieving that end.
Id.
297 French, supra note 291, at 164:
Shopping for a new church, temple, or religious affiliation is now commonplace. In the United
States, a family that moves to a new town commonly shops around for the church or other
religious institution that suits them best. A person might be raised Catholic, not participate in
any organized religion for several years, spend a few months in a Zen monastery, and then join
the local Baptist church when she settles down and marries. After ten years, when her family is
relocated to another part of the country, it is by no means unusual for the family to join a
different religious group once they have visited various institutions in the new town.
Id.; see also id. at 165 (relating the experience of a couple who reported that they "'shopped for a church like
they would shop for a car, looking for something comfortable and practical."').
298 Id. at 165-66; see also Swatos & Christiano, supra note 289, at 222, 225:
Religious (or, more broadly, ideological) pluralism clearly creates a marketplace of ideas wherein
absolute claims for ultimacy are always at some degree of risk. This gives rise to a model of
religious competition or marketplace, and in a double sense. Not only is there competition
among religions themselves, but there is also the freedom on the part of buyers (people) to pick
and choose among the ideological wares that different religions proffer. This has been referred to
as "religion a la carte" and the result as bricolage.
Pluralism is not only competition among multiple historic religious traditions, but it is also
competition between historical religious approaches to doing better and other systems of doing
better.
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theological boundaries reflects the ever-increasing importance that individuals
place on whether their religion helps them meet the demands of everyday life,
rather than whether its teachings conform to an ultimate reality.
299
When individual conscience and personal experience are the signal
characteristic of religion, religion itself becomes increasingly difficult to
distinguish from secular moralities and ideologies. 30 0  And when religion
ceases to be a unique experience or commitment in a society that values
equality, it also becomes impossible to justify exemptions that are restricted to
believers. 3° 1  To satisfy the demands of equality, such exemptions must be
expanded to protect secular moral and political commitments that are
comparable to personal religious experience. 30 2  Such an expansion of the
reach of exemptions, however, threatens to make them unworkable by leaving
too few people subject to the law. 30 3
Id. (citations omitted); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 288, at 67 ("[R]eligion is but one of many comparable
experiences."); see also Berger, supra note 285, at 448 (Many religious people today "assert that they are not
'religious' at all, but are pursuing a quest for 'spirituality'.... Hervieu-Ldger uses Claude Levi-Strauss' term
'bricolage' to describe this form of religiosity-people putting together a religion of their own like children
tinkering with a lego-set, picking and choosing from available religious 'material."').
299 Berger, supra note 292, at 446, 447 (noting the "declining number of people who profess traditional
religious beliefs" and define and practice "their religiosity in non-traditional, individualized and institutionally
loose ways."); HARGROVE, supra note 295, at 127-28:
The church, for many modems who are involved in it at all, is rather more like a service station
than an institution. It provides celebrations for special events-christenings, marriages, funerals,
and the like. It provides a brief and cheap education in moral values for the children. It is a good
place to get together with people who share similar interests and points of view. And through
short-term study groups or the like it can be a useful tool in the modem religious quest.
Id.; see Swatos & Christiano, supra note 289, at 224 ("[The historical religions are less likely to carry the
level of isomorphism between individual experience and larger cultural context that has been the case in the
past ... ").
300 See Conkle, supra note 288, at 14, 15 (In a "religiously neutral, autonomy-driven understanding of
conscience," we "define our own consciences and determine what they require. Our consciences might
include religious obligations, but then again they might not; it all depends on our particular self-definitions.").
301 See, e.g., Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation, supra note 177, at 569-72; see also Feldman, supra note
69, at 425 ("Our secular consciousness tends to suggest that protection previously reserved for religion should
be extended to other deeply held beliefs."); see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 288, at 68 (noting that those
committed to formal equality maintain that "religious institutions are now no more distinctive or important
than analogous, secular enterprises. If religion is, like therapy, a source of mental comfort and well-being,
why should religious institutions be treated any differently from mental health facilities? If religion is, like art,
a source of spiritual beauty and transcendence, why should religious institutions bear any different relationship
to the state than museums?").
302 See Conkle, supra note 288, at 14 ("[Flormal neutrality has the effect of leveling religious and
nonreligious claims of conscience.").
303 E.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 452 (1988) ("[Gjovemment
simply could not operate if it were required to satisfy every citizen's religious needs and desires."); see
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Smith can be understood as a manifestation of the fear that religious
exemptions would end in governmental paralysis. In a cultural climate in
which religious practice is indistinguishable from other forms of personal
activity, a doctrine that mandates exemptions for religious practices burdened
by government action would inevitably expand into a doctrine that mandates
exemptions for practices springing from any moral, political, and/or other
comparable personal commitment.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The principal source of the fundamental law of religious freedom in the
United States is decisions by the federal judiciary interpreting the meaning of
the Religion Clauses. These are followed by RLUIPA and RFRA (which
provide for religious exemptions from federal and state laws in certain
circumstances) and federal anti-discrimination statutes (which prohibit
religious discrimination in a variety of specific contexts), together with federal
regulations promulgated under the authority of such statutes. Executive orders
by the President, such as the charitable choice directives, bind the federal
bureaucracy and thus are another important, albeit ambiguous, source of law.
Finally, state constitutions, state statutes and state regulations remain important
sources of religious freedom law when federal sources are absent or
inapplicable. In contrast to most other countries, particularly those in Western
Europe, international human rights law plays virtually no role in the
construction of doctrine relating to religious freedom in the United States.
Articulated in terms of "limitations," the law in the United States is that
religious activity generally may be limited for any reason other than anti-
religious animus. Doctrinally, the general constitutional rule in the United
States is that religiously neutral and generally applicable laws that incidentally
burden religious actions are subject to minimal judicial scrutiny, unless such
laws burden constitutional rights in addition to the free exercise of religion, or
permit or exhibit a discriminatory pattern of exemptions. Although federal and
state judges in the United States generally lack authority to mandate religious
Gedicks, supra note 177, at 106 (suggesting that the Court may have denied the Amish a social security tax
exemption in United States v. Lee for fear that the government would be inundated with claims for the same
exemption); see also Feldman, supra note 69, at 420 ("Can we argue today that religion is somehow different
from other state purposes, or would we be required to respect conscience in every case and conclude that
anyone who disagrees fundamentally with a government expenditure may choose to opt out of paying taxes for
that purpose'?").
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exemptions from religiously burdensome laws, Congress and the state
legislatures are free to enact such exemptions by statute, if they wish.
Structural limitations on religious freedom in the United States include a
continuing constitutional and cultural commitment to the separation of church
and state, which permits and sometimes even requires disadvantageous
treatment of religiously motivated actions relative to actions motivated by
secular moralities or ideologies. The dilution of the church autonomy doctrine,
which formerly protected a group right of internal church self-government, has
similarly facilitated greater regulations of churches and other religious groups.
Finally, three current political and social trends are likely to undermine
development and enforcement of strong substantive protection for religious
freedom in the United States. The persistence of controversies posed by
judicial review of federal and state action suggests that the law of religious
freedom in the United States may become increasingly subject to majoritarian
norms and preferences. Similarly, the recent revitalization of judicially
enforced federalism norms may weaken federal statutory protections for
religious freedom by weakening the traditional role of Congress in protecting
minority rights,. Finally, the radical increase in religious diversity in the
United States suggests that granting unique protection to religious actions will
become increasingly less practical, so long as equality rationales predominate




CASE STUDIES: THE UNITED STATES
1. USE OF CONTRABAND
Assume there is a group that is widely recognized as a traditional religious
entity and that no one questions the sincerity of the believers. As a part of its
religious practice, members of the group smoke opium together in their
religious service, even though using opium is strictly prohibited by the
criminal law. The members of the group are arrested during a religious
service while smoking opium, and they are prosecuted for violation of the drug
laws. The members of the group use freedom to manifest their religion as a
defense at their criminal trial. How would the courts treat this defense?
There is little doubt that a religious liberty defense to religious use of
opium would be rejected by both federal and state courts. Criminal anti-drug
laws in the United States are always framed in secular terms and typically have
a broad sweep, so they are unlikely candidates to fail the General Rule.
Moreover, even supporters of the pre-Smith compelling interest test might view
eradication of illegal drug use a sufficiently weighty government interest to
justify denying an exemption from anti-drug laws even to well-established and
sincere religious users.304 For the same reason, it seems unlikely that state
constitutions or statutory RFRAs would underwrite such a defense.
Because some opiates, like morphine, have legitimate medical applications
as painkillers, it is likely that a U.S. law criminalizing the possession, sale, and
use of "opium" would contain an exemption for such applications. That would
provide an opportunity for the believers to argue under the broader
understanding of general applicability that their nonexempt use of opium in
traditional religious rituals does not threaten the purposes of the criminal
prohibition any more than do the exempt medical uses. In response, the
government might be able to distinguish the medical exemption on the basis of
strict government regulation and control of opiates used for medical purposes;
such controls could not be duplicated in the religious setting because of
Religion Clause prohibitions on courts' making theological judgments and
generally on their intervening in the internal governance of religious groups.
Although no U.S. court is likely to recognize the freedom to manifest
religion as a defense to criminal liability, it is conceivable that the sincerity of
304 See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 906 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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the believers and the traditional status of the religion would be recognized as
factors legitimately mitigating the sentence or other punishment.
305
2. PRISONS
While serving a ten-year armed robbery sentence, a prisoner converts to
the Sikh religion. The prison officials believe that the conversion is sincere.
The prisoner announces that he wishes: (a) not to cut his hair, (b) to wear a
turban, (c) to eat food properly prepared, and (d) to carry a ritual knife. Does
the country have any rules or regulations permitting such actions? If prison
regulations prohibit any of these requests, and assuming that there is some
type of administrative procedure that allows the prisoner to seek a change in
the policy as it applies to him, how would a competent court rule on each of
the four points?
As a general matter, U.S. courts give considerable deference to the
administrative decisions of prison officials. The difficulty and danger entailed
in controlling convicted felons in a close environment results in a general
judicial reluctance to second-guess the judgments of prison officials about
what is required to maintain a safe and orderly environment for inmates,
visitors, and prison employees.
Even prior to Smith, burdens imposed by prisons on the free exercise rights
of inmates were evaluated under a considerably less stringent standard than the
compelling interest. 306 After Smith, it is possible that such burdens continue to
be evaluated under an less stringent standard than the one that the courts would
normally apply-that is, courts might be more forgiving of lack of religious
neutrality or general applicability under the General Rule in a prison policy
than in some other context.307 For the present, this is not an important practical
305 Cf. Vue v. INS, 1995 US App LEXIS 12619, No. 93-70783 (9 h Cir. Nov. 23, 1995) (holding as
mitigating factor in deportation proceedings that nonresident Hmong shaman convicted of opium use and
possession engaged in such use for genuine religious purposes without an intent to distribute).
306 See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (holding that prison regulations burdening
inmate free exercise need only be .'reasonably related to legitimate penological interests') (quoting Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)); e.g., Martinelli v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 1499, 1506-07 (1 1' Cir. 1987) (holding
that prison rules prohibiting long hair and beards and refusing to provide kosher diet were rationally related to
"substantial" government interests in maintaining prison security, identifying escapees, and avoiding cost
overruns).
307 See, e.g., Muhammad v. City of N.Y. Dept. of Corrections, 904 F. Supp. 161,193-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(holding that provision of "generic" worship services by state prison for Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, and
Muslim inmates but not to Nation of Islam inmates satisfied the compelling interest test, where the prison
lacked sufficient officers, space, and time to provide additional services while still maintaining internal order,
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issue, because RFRA (in case of federal prisons) and RLUIPA (in case of state
prisons) require application of the compelling interest in case of any burden on
inmate religious practices, and not just in case of violation of the religious
neutrality or general applicability aspects of the General Rule. 30 8 Should either
law be overturned, however, the question whether the General Rule and the
Individualized Assessment Exception apply less stringently to prisons would
move to the forefront.
Although courts are inclined to find that burdens imposed by prisons on
inmate free exercise rights satisfy the compelling interest test, application of
that test occasionally results in some modest additional protection for inmate
free exercise than might be expected under the General Rule. For example,
prohibitions on inmates' wearing long hair, hats or other head coverings, or on
carrying weapons are religiously neutral, generally applicable, and easily
justified by legitimate safety, anti-smuggling, and anti-gang concerns. Refusal
to customize prisoner food to accommodate religious diets is easily justified on
cost and administrative convenience grounds. While the safety, anti-
smuggling, and anti-gang goals of a prison prohibition on hats and head
coverings will certainly be found compelling by the courts under the
compelling interest test mandated by both RFRA and RLUIPA, such concerns
may not be compelling while the inmate is confined to his or her cell, as
opposed to circulating among the general inmate population. 309  Thus, a less
and where Nation of Islam inmates had access to a Nation of Islam clergyman). See generally Cruz v. Beto,
405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972) (stating that prisons need not provide every religious sect within a prison with
identical facilities, personnel, and privileges, regardless of the number of inmate adherents).
A similar attitude seems to exist with respect to analysis of religious classifications in prison policies
under the Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses. See, e.g., Muhammad, 904 F. Supp. at 197-99 (holding
that provision of "generic" worship services by state prison for Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, and Muslim
inmates but not to Nation of Islam inmates did not violate the Establishment or Equal Protection Clauses).
308 The terms of both laws are virtually identical as applied to prison inmates. Compare RFRA, 42 U.S.C.
2000bb-1 ("Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results
from a rule of general applicability," unless the burden "is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest," and "is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest."), with
RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-I ("No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of
a person residing in or confined to an institution ... , even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person .. is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest," and "is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.").
309 See, e.g., Young v. Lane, 922 F.2d 370, 375-77 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that prison policy of
permitting inmate wearing of yarmulkes only in cells and at religious services was justified by prison's interest
in controlling contraband and preventing use of head coverings as gang identifiers); see also Best v. Kelly, 879
F.Supp. 305, 309 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that an inmate has no free exercise right to wear his yarmulke
outside of his cell).
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restrictive alternative to a general ban on head coverings would be to allow
inmates to wear religious head coverings while confined in their cells. Under
the minimal scrutiny required by the General Rule, however, such an
alternatives analysis is not required. On the other hand, the prison's interest in
keeping weapons away from inmates is compelling in every part of the prison,
and would justify a general prohibition on prisoner possession of any kind of
knife in any part of the prison.
The outcome of the special diet request is the most difficult to predict. This
is mostly a matter of cost and administrative convenience, and it is difficult to
imagine that, so long as the cost of satisfying religious diet requests by inmates
is not prohibitive, the prison's desire to serve all inmates the same food
because it is the easiest way to feed them would rise to the level of a
"compelling" interest.310 On the other hand, a prison with a religiously diverse
prison population which would require accommodation of multiple different
religious diets (kosher, Muslim, Sikh, vegetarian) might plausibly argue that
the cost and inconvenience of cooking and serving so many different diets
threatens its ability to provide a basic healthful diet for all inmates, thereby
satisfying the compelling interest test.
3. MILITARY
While serving in the army, a Jewish soldier responsible for driving trucks
becomes increasingly religious and finally decides to observe Orthodox
Judaism. His Rabbi supports his efforts to: (a) wear a yarmulke head covering
at all times, (b) eat only kosher food, (c) be exempt from any requirements to
drive vehicles on the Sabbath (except in times of war), and (d) grow a beard.
Does the military in the country have any regulations on these issues? If the
military does not currently permit him to observe any of these practices,
assume that the army has prepared studies which conclude that such
The Young decision ignored the policy's lack of general applicability arising from the fact that prison
officials permitted the wearing of baseball caps on the ground that permitting a "uniform headgear" served the
prison's interest in avoiding use of head coverings to signify gang membership. 922 F.2d at 375-76. It is not
clear that such a justification would have satisfied the compelling interest test if the court have found that the
prison policy was substantially underinclusive and, therefore, not generally applicable.
310 Cf Beersheide v. Suthers, 286 F.3d 1179, 1185-92 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that failure to provide
orthodox Jewish inmate kosher meals violated Free Exercise Clause where provision of such meals would not
have had a significant impact on prison budget and procedures); Martinelli v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 1499, 1508
(1 1th Cir. 1987) (holding that Greek Orthodox prisoner who claimed a religious prohibition on the eating of
nonkosher meat should be permitted to eat from the pork-free serving line when available, and to choose
nonpork items from the regular line at other times).
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exemptions would harm military morale generally, would be expensive, would
interfere with military preparedness, and would harm national security.
Assuming that there is some type of administrative procedure that allows the
soldier to seek a change in the policies, how would a competent court decide
such questions?
The armed forces constitute another special context in which United States
courts generally defer to the determinations of government officials.31' Courts
are especially leery of ordering the military to make religious accommodations
when military officials believe that such accommodations would interfere with
the efficient performance of military duties and missions. 312 Finally, since the
armed forces in the United States are all-volunteer organizations in which no
one is required to serve, members of the armed forces may be viewed by U.S.
courts as having consented to or otherwise accepted military limitations on
their right to religious exercise.
313
The basic statement of military policy with respect to religious
accommodations suggests that "requests for accommodation of religious
practices should be approved by commanders when accommodation will not
have an adverse impact on military readiness, unit cohesion, standards, or
discipline,314 and specifically advises that accommodations for worship
services, religious holy days, Sabbath observance, religious diets, and religious
apparel should be extended to members of the armed forces when such
accommodations do not interfere with military necessity and other military
requirements. 315 Nevertheless, the actual determination whether to grant an
accommodation is left to "the exercise of command discretion" by the
responsible officer, and the policy specifically states none of its suggestions for
accommodation is to be interpreted as requiring a specific accommodation in
any individual case.3 16  Air Force commands are reputed to be the most
flexible in granting religious accommodations, and Marine Corps commands
the least flexible.
3H See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 506 (1986).
312 See id.
313 Cf. "Accommodation of "Religious Practices Within the Military Services, Department of Defense
Directive No. 1300.17, 3.2.5 (Feb. 3, 1988) [hereinafter Directive 1300.17] ("The Military Departments
should develop a statement advising of DoD policy on individual religious practices and military requirements
to applicants for commissioning, enlistment, and reenlistment.").
114 Directive 1300.17, 3.1.
315 See id. 13.2.1 to -.3 & -.6.
316 Id. 3.2.
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As with prisons, it is not clear whether pre-Smith decisions imposing less
stringent standards for evaluating government burdens on the religious exercise
of members of the armed forces apply as well to dilute the General Rule or the
Individualized Assessment Exception. This is a particularly important
question in the military context because the military policy that vests
exemption-granting authority in the discretion of individual military
commanders based on particular facts and circumstances clearly amounts to a
system of individualized assessments. As such, the failure of a commander to
consider religious beliefs as sufficient to justify exemption when comparable
secular beliefs or considerations are deemed sufficient would require
application of the compelling interest test to denials of religious
accommodations under the Individualized Assessment Exception.
The U.S. military is required by statute to permit its members to wear
religious apparel with their uniforms so long as the apparel is "neat and
conservative" and does not interfere with the performance of military duties.
317
A yarmulke qualifies on both counts; indeed, this statute was enacted precisely
to reverse the Supreme Court's holding that an Air Force commander was not
required to permit a military psychiatrist under his command to wear a
yarmulke while in uniform.3 18 The wearing of a yarmulke is specifically
approved in the military's basic statement of policy.
319
It is likely that even a soldier who converts to Judaism after joining the
military will be able to obtain kosher meals, and to be excused from Sabbath
work. Military policy specifically encourages commanders to consider
religious belief as a factor in determining whether to order separate rations for
soldiers, and further authorizes them to permit individuals with special
religious dietary restrictions to provide their own rations when in the field or at
32032
sea. 0 The Air Force, for example, even provides kosher field rations.32'
Military policy also encourages accommodations for observance of the
Sabbath and other religious holy days, except when such accommodations "are
precluded by military necessity." The Military Personnel Manual goes further,
317 10 U.S.C. '774 (2002); accord Directive 1300.17. 3.2.7. Under the Directive, "neat and
conservative" items of religious apparel are "discreet, tidy, and not dissonant or showy in style, size, design,
brightness, or color," and do not replace, alter, or interfere with the wearing of the prescribed military uniform.
Directive 1300.17, 3.2.7.2 The standard, "neat and conservative," is of course inherently biased against
minority religions, since both concepts depend on a majoritarian frame of cultural and political reference.
318 See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 503.
319 See Directive 1300.17, 3.2.7.3.
320 See Directive 1300.17, 3.2.2.
321 See AIR FORCE MANuAL 52-103 (noting the availability of kosher substitutes for MREs).
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mandating that military personnel shall generally observe the Sabbath on
Sunday, and that those whose beliefs require Sabbath observance on another
day "will be afforded the opportunity to observe the requirements of their
religious principles," unless this conflicts with "compelling military
necessity.
322
On the other hand, it is unlikely that a Jewish convert would be exempted
from military regulations that prohibit beards. Military policy expressly
removes "hair and grooming practices" from the provision that encourages
accommodation of religious apparel.323
4. DISTRIBUTION OF LITERATURE
An Evangelical Christian woman decides to distribute free copies of some
religious literature on the sidewalks of a large city. The city has three
misdemeanor ordinances that prohibit (a) littering, (b) interfering with motor
vehicle traffic, and (c) creating a public nuisance. As the woman distributes
the free copies of the booklets, some people drop them on the streets, others
start reading them and, without looking, walk onto streets and cause cars to
stop. Some merchants come up to her and start shouting that she is creating a
disturbance and interfering with customers coming into their stores. Police
arrest the woman and the prosecutor charges her with three misdemeanor
violations. Assuming that she would properly have been convicted of all three
offenses if she had been distributing handouts advertising a shoe sale, would
she have any additional protections because she was distributing religious
material?
Assuming that the evangelical Christian is convicted of all of the offenses,
the General Rule does not give her any additional protection; all three
ordinances appear to be religiously neutral and generally applicable. It is
nonetheless quite unlikely that convictions of the evangelical Christian on any
of the offenses, let alone all three, would be upheld by U.S. courts. General
secular principles under the Speech Clause of the First Amendment are almost
certain to protect her leafleting against government punishment, even pursuant
to religiously neutral and generally applicable laws.
322 MILITARY PERSONNEL MANUAL 1731-010 (emphasis added.); see also id. 1731-20 ("Consistent with
the exigencies of the service, commanding officers are encouraged to give favorable consideration of
applications for leave from those who may desire to observe significant holy days with their families,"
including Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur).
323 Directive 1300.17, 3.2.7.1.
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In the United States, the public has special claim on public streets,
sidewalks, and parks as venues for speech and expression. 324 Government may
regulate speech in such "public forums" only by means of so-called "time,
place, or manner restrictions" that (I) are content-neutral, (ii) are narrowly
drawn to protect a "significant" governmental interest, and (iii) leave open
"ample" alternative avenues of communication. 325  Government may prohibit
speech in such locations only if the prohibition is narrowly drawn to protect a
"compelling" governmental interest. 326
All three ordinances are likely to be content-neutral on their face. It is
doubtful, however, that the anti-litter and public nuisance ordinances would be
found to protect a significant or compelling governmental interest. The
Supreme Court has held that litter prevention is an insufficiently important
government interest to justify either an absolute prohibition on leafleting, 327
and bans on anonymous leafleting have been invalidated despite weightier
justifications than litter prevention.328  It is likewise clear that so long as
leafletters do not completely block the passage of pedestrians on a sidewalk,
and only momentarily detain those to whom they distribute their literature,
they may not be found guilty of creating a "public nuisance" under the Speech
Clause, even if it is true that they are attracting attention away from
commercial establishments or otherwise making it marginally more difficult
for pedestrians to enter such establishments or use the sidewalk.32 9
324 See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) ("Wherever the title of streets and parks my rest, they
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thought between citizens, and discussing public questions.").
325 E.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171,
177 (1983); Heffron v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647-51 (1981).
326 E.g., Grace, 461 U.S. at 177.
327 Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 149 (1943); see also. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 151
(1939) (city's interest in keeping "the streets clean and of good appearance" held "insufficient" to justify a
municipal ordinance prohibiting the distribution of leaflets on public property).
328 E.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (prohibition on distribution of
campaign leaflets without name and address of issuer, for purpose of preventing "fraud, false advertising, and
libel," held unconstitutional burden on freedom of speech); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960) (same
with respect to general prohibition on anonymous leafleting); see also Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. of N.Y
v. Village of Stratton, 122 S. Ct. 2080, 2089-90 (2002) (striking down door-to-door solicitation permit
designed to prevent fraud and crime and to protect residential privacy, because, inter alia, permit virtually
eliminated anonymous and spontaneous solicitation).
329 E.g. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,308-10 (1940).
Public nuisance statutes are generally suspect under the Speech Clause because of their notorious lack
of specificity. The consequent delegation to police officers of essentially unbounded discretion to ascertain
what constitutes a statutory violation creates the danger that such statutes will be enforced only against
speakers of unpopular messages. See generally Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Gooding v.
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Traffic and pedestrian safety is an undoubted compelling interest that
would justify prohibition if necessary to protect the public. Unlike some
speech activities, however, such as a demonstration on a public street,
leafleting does not present the kind of unavoidable danger which requires
either prohibition of the speech or closure of the street to vehicular traffic to
protect public safety. The threat to public safety is not caused by the
leafleting, but rather by the negligent inattention of pedestrians receiving
leaflets. Accordingly, a narrowly drawn means of protecting public safety in
this circumstance would be use of police officers to ticket and otherwise to
control pedestrians who are endangering their own and others' safety by
violating traffic laws.
330
Finally, the Supreme Court has been particularly solicitous of inexpensive
means of communications, and has regularly held that expensive means of
communicating one's message are not adequate alternatives for inexpensive
means, particularly if the latter are a traditional method of communication. 331
General prohibitions on leafleting are typically invalidated on this ground.
3 2
5. REGISTRATION/RECOGNITION/LEGAL PERSONALITY
Many countries have requirements for allocating certain privileges or a
particular status to religious organizations (e.g., juristic personality, tax-
exemption, the granting of public funds) to the satisfaction of particular
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972). See also Frederick Mark Gedicks, Towards a Defensible Free Exercise
Doctrine, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 925,938-40 (2000) (discussing standardless licensing cases).
330 Cf. Schneider, 308 U.S. at 150 (suggesting that instead of prohibiting leafleting altogether, city
authorities could prevent litter by punishing those who throw leaflets on the ground).
331 E.g., Watchtower Bible, 122 S. Ct. at 2087 ("[B]ecause they lack significant financial resources, the
ability of the [Jehovah's] Witnesses to proselytized is seriously diminished by regulations that burden their
efforts to canvass door-to-door. [] In addition, the [Court's] cases discuss extensively the historical importance
of door-to-door canvassing and pamphleteering as vehicles for the dissemination of ideas."); Ladue, 512 U.S.
at 57 (Ban on residential yard and window signs left inadequate communicative alternatives because
residential signs are "an unusually cheap and convenient form of communication, especially for persons of
modest means or limited mobility."); Martin, 319 at 146 n.9 (Ban on door-to-door distribution of leaflets
invalidated because such distribution "is essential to the poorly financed causes of little people."); see also
Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 n.30 (1984) (The Court has shown
"special solicitude for forms of expression that are much less expensive than feasible alternatives and hence
may be important to a large segment of the Citizenry."). But see, Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 549 n.20
(upholding ban on graffiti even though graffiti is an "inexpensive means of communicating political,
commercial, and frivolous messages to large numbers of people" and "some creators of graffiti have no
effective alternative means of publicly expressing themselves").
332 Schneider, 308 U.S. at 147-50 (distribution of leaflets on public street); see also Watchtower Bible,
122 S.Ct. at 2091 (door-to-door distribution of leaflets); Martin, 319 U.S. at 146 n.9 (same).
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conditions (e.g., a minimum number of members, being "traditional," or being
recognized by some body as serving a public utility).333 Suppose that there is
some religious group that does not meet one of the criteria and they are denied
the privilege or status they seek. Assuming that there is some procedural
mechanism for the group to bring a claim and the group argues that the state
discriminated against them on the basis of religion or belief. Assume also that
the judge finds that: (a) there was discrimination on the basis of religion, and
(b) the state may not discriminate unless it has done so on the basis of one of
the legitimate grounds for limiting the manifestation of religion. What
arguments would the state make for such discrimination and what would be the
final decision of the judge?
In general, the extent to which a religious group enjoys religious liberty in
the United States does not depend on its form of organization. The United
States has no special organization or registration procedures for religious
groups; such groups may avail themselves of any of the various organizations
methods generally provided by statute and at common law-e.g., for-profit
incorporation, nonprofit incorporation, corporation sole, unincorporated
association-provided that such groups satisfy the necessary requirements of
the form of organization they choose.
Again, one of the assumptions of this hypothetical is that denying benefits
to a religious organization because of its failure to satisfy the requirements of a
religiously neutral, generally applicable law could constitute religious
discrimination. Under the General Rule, any such denial is by definition not
discriminatory and therefore not actionable under the Free Exercise Clause.
Indeed, one might argue that exempting religious organizations, but not
comparable secular organizations, from the requirements of a neutral and
general law constitutes government favoritism of religion that violates the
Establishment Clause.
Perhaps the area of law that comes closest to the hypothetical is the
revocation of a church's federal tax-exempt status for using an excessive
amount of its funds to engage in partisan lobbying. The federal Internal
Revenue Service has a strong policy against a nonprofit organization's use of
the advantages of tax-exempt status to promote partisan political candidates or
causes. Nonprofits who wish to exceed the narrow limits which the IRS places
on partisan lobbying must confine their lobbying activities to a taxable, for-
333 Conditions such as, for example, a minimum number of members, being "traditional," or being
recognized by some body as serving a public utility.
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profit subsidiary. Prior to Smith, some commentators and churches had
claimed that the ability to speak out on any public issue, partisan or not, was an
inherent aspect of religious group autonomy protected by the Free Exercise
Clause, so that churches were constitutionally exempt from complying with
IRS regulations specifying the limits, manner, and means of partisan lobbying
by nonprofit organizations. After Smith, however, it seems clear that churches
possess no special insulation from government regulation of the partisan
lobbying activities of nonprofit groups. Indeed, in the 2000 presidential
election, the IRS revoked the tax exempt status of a church that had used a
substantial amount of its tax-exempt funds to print and distribute literature
endorsing Republican Party candidates. Since the regulations are religiously
neutral, generally applicable, and do not rely on a system of individualized
assessments, Smith simply does not recognize that such a revocation can
constitute religious discrimination.
An argument could be made under RFRA to the effect that the tax-exempt
lobbying regulations burden religious activity and thus must satisfy the
compelling interest test, but it seems likely that the IRS policy of preventing
the subsidy of partisan politics by tax exempt funds would be a sufficiently
compelling interest to justify application of the regulations even to religious
groups who feel conscientiously obligated to endorse candidates on partisan
grounds.
It is conceivable, of course, that a statute that is facially neutral with respect
to religion nevertheless may have a dramatically negative disproportionate
effect on a particular religion. The suspicion in such a circumstance is that the
statute constitutes a religious "gerrymander"-that is, the apparently neutral
statutory classifications were purposely defined precisely to create a
disproportionate and negative effect on a small number of disfavored religious
groups.334 In such a circumstance, the government would have to satisfy the
compelling interest test-that is, it would have to prove that the statutory
classifications protect a compelling governmental interest that cannot be
protected in any less intrusive or restrictive manner. Although the Supreme
Court has noted the possibility that avoidance of an Establishment Clause
334 The term "gerrymander" dates from the early nineteenth century, and was a coined to describe a
bizarre, salamander-shaped congressional district drawn by the Massachusetts state legislature to ensure the
election of a member of the political party lead by Governor Elbridge Gerry. 5 ENCYCL. BRITANNICA 222
(University of Chicago Press, 15th ed. 1987).
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violation might satisfy the compelling interest test, 335 outside of the
Establishment Clause, no decision has ever recognized a government interest
sufficiently important that it justifies government discrimination against a
particular religion.
336
6. STATE SCHOOLS: RELIGIOUS GARB
Muslim and Orthodox Jewish teachers and students at a state school wish
to wear headscarves as part of their religious observance. Does the state (or
schools) have rules governing the wearing of such garb? If there are rules at
state schools prohibiting the wearing of headcoverings, what would be the
likely outcome if the teacher and student challenged the rules or practices?
The analysis is affected somewhat by the status of the believer as teacher or
student, so I will consider these separately.
1. Students
Most public schools in the United States have some sort of dress code. The
purpose of such a code is to avoid disciplinary altercations or other distractions
from the educational process that might be caused by student dress or
appearance. Thus, school dress codes commonly prohibit clothing that is
exceptionally immodest or associated with gang violence. It would be unusual
for a public school dress code to single out religious apparel for any sort of
focused attention; much more likely is a code's general prohibition of an
article of clothing for some legitimate disciplinary reason-say, a prohibition
on "hats or head coverings of any kind" because of their frequent use to
identify one with a gang-which sweeps into its coverage religious apparel
like head scarves.
Once again, if the dress code is religiously neutral and general applicable,
the General Rule will provide no relief to believers who are required to keep
their heads covered as a matter of religious conscience. It would not be
uncommon, however, for the administrators charged with enforcing dress
codes to make frequent exceptions on a variety of secular grounds. For
335 See Capitol Sq. Rev. & Adv. Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761-62 (1995) (observing that "compliance
with the establishment clause is a state interest sufficiently compelling to justify content based restrictions on
speech").
336 The so-called "War against Terrorism" may push these limits to the extent that it has legitimated




example, the school might exempt from the prohibition students who need to
keep their heads covered for medical reasons or who wear caps bearing the
logo of the school's baseball team. In that instance, a student might challenge
the general applicability of the hat prohibition or, what in my opinion amounts
to the same thing, might argue that it incorporates a system of individualized
assessments. In either case, the student would argue that the school's interest
in generally prohibiting hats could not be that important because it commonly
allows exemptions from the prohibition, and could argue further that the
prohibition is not generally applicable because it is underinclusive and exempts
head coverings on secular grounds but not religious grounds. Moreover, to the
extent that the dress code permits other manifestations of religious belief in
ones' dress or appearance, such as the wearing of crucifixes and other religious
jewelry or beards or hairstyles for religious reasons, students might also argue
a lack of religious neutrality.
In most public school districts it is likely that religious head scarves would
be accommodated despite a general policy against hats or head coverings. In
school districts which lack cultural diversity, however, one cannot
underestimate the possibility that school administrators might find head
scarves bizarre and therefore distracting, particularly given their association
with Islam in the current war environment.
337
2. Teachers
The foregoing analysis is complicated when applied to classroom teachers
by the fact that teachers are representatives of the state. Courts have
recognized a school's legitimate interest, particularly in elementary grades, in
controlling a teacher's classroom appearance and conduct in relation to
religion, in order to ensure that students are not religiously coerced or
otherwise mislead into believing that the school endorses a teacher's religious
beliefs or practices. For example, courts have upheld restrictions on
338clothing, expressions of faith, Bible reading, and similar kinds of religiousspeech and expression by teachers on this ground.
... Cf. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (noting evidence in the record of criticism
and disparagement by teachers of students who practiced nonevangelical or non-Christian religions).
338 See, e.g., Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 4J, 723 P.2d 298 (Oregon 1986) (upholding state
prohibition on religious dress by teachers as applied to Sikh who wore turban and white clothing, on ground
that statute properly sought to ensure avoidance of the appearance of sectarian influence, favoritism, or official
approval in state schools); see also United States v. Board of Educ. Sch. Dist. Phila., 911 F.2d 882 (3d Cir.
1990) (rejecting claim that application of similar statute against Muslim who wore chadha covering all but her
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On the other hand, the Court has made it clear that the government may not
deny a person government employment in a way that infringes on his or her
freedom of expression. 339 It would seem that a head scarf, without more, is not
so unusual or distracting that it must be absolutely prohibited in even an
elementary school classroom. A less restrictive alternative would seem to be
agreement between the school and the teacher about how the teacher should
disclose that the head scarf is a religious requirement and otherwise answer
inevitable student questions. Under the General Rule, however, a meaningful
alternatives analysis is not required unless a statute lacks religious neutrality or
general applicability, or the Individualized Assessment Exception applies.
7. STATE SCHOOLS: PARTICIPATION IN RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCES
A student in a state school refuses to participate in a mandatory school
program honoring the country's soldiers killed in war. The student asserts
that on the basis of her pacifist beliefs, which are part of her religion (and
which are acknowledged by the school to be sincere beliefs), she cannot
participate in the ceremony. The school orders her to participate on the pain
of expulsion from school. When she refuses, she is expelled. Assuming that
she may bring a case for relief, how will a competent court decide her case?
It is well established under the Speech Clause that government may not
force individuals to engage in affirmations which contradict their personal
beliefs, including religious beliefs. For example, the Speech Clause does not
permit a school to require that pacifist students participate in an school
ceremony in which students pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States.
Similarly, the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from requiring
that a person declare his or her belief in God as a condition to becoming a
notary.340 The Free Exercise Clause does not add anything to this analysis.
There is an important distinction, however, between requiring that students
simply learn information as part of the school's educational curriculum, and
requiring that students affirm their belief in the truth or accuracy of such
information. The Speech Clause does not require, for example, that
evangelical Christians who believe in divine creation of the earth ex nihilo be
face while working as substitute teacher did not violate Title VII duty of employer to make reasonable
religious accommodations).
339 See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
340 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); see also supra note 8 (discussing the Religious Test Clause).
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excused from a biology class in which the students are required to learn the
basics of neo-Darwinist evolution: Although parents have an absolute right to
send their children to accredited private rather than public schools or, in many
states, to educate their children at home rather than at any school, in most
states parents do not have an unqualified right to pick and choose from among
the required curriculum which classes their children will attend, and which
they will not.
A key inquiry in this hypothetical would be whether the "participation" to
which student objects is mere attendance at the war memorial ceremony, or
extends to some act or circumstance which might imply that the student
endorses or otherwise believes in the sentiments being expressed at the
ceremony. The Speech Clause does not mandate exemption in the former
situation, 34 but does in the latter. The Free Exercise Clause might have some
relevance to participation as attendance. However, if any student is excused
from attending the ceremony for a some nonreligious reason-say, because the
student has had difficulty adjusting to the loss of a parent or other close
relative in a war, and the memorial service is likely to trigger depression or
some other serious emotional reaction-this may provide the basis under the
broad reading of general applicability or under the Individualized Assessment
Exception for arguing that the religious pacifist is being treated unequally by
the school's recognition of a personal or a secular reason for nonattendance,
but not for an apparently comparable religious reason.. At the least, the school
should be required to explain why the religious reason is not in fact
comparable.
8. BLOOD TRANSFUSIONS
A family of three was injured in an automobile accident. The father and
daughter were severely injured and were unconscious by the time they arrived
at the hospital. The mother was seriously injured, but fully conscious. At the
hospital the woman announced that her religion forbids her from receiving a
blood transfusion, and that she also does not want either her husband or child
341 The Establishment Clause, however, would mandate invalidation of any memorial seriice that was
sponsored or organized by the school and which involved a prayer. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530
U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Sch. Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). Collectively, these cases are known as
the School Prayer Cases.
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to receive a blood transfusion. The hospital has no reason to doubt the
woman's sincerity. How would a competent court handle this case?
The Free Exercise Clause and the First Amendment generally only bind
government. Because most hospitals in the United States are privately owned
and operated, government action in this hypothetical is likely to present itself
in the form of a court order sought by the hospital or the wife under expedited
procedures ordering or enjoining blood transfusions.
Few constitutional rights in the United States are absolute. Even the pre-
Smith compelling interest test permitted the government to intrude upon
religious freedom in service to an exceptionally important state interest that
could not be protected in any less restrictive manner. It is difficult to imagine
a more important government interest than protecting a child from a serious
threat to his or her life or health. Accordingly, most courts in the United States
have authorized doctors to intervene, even against the religious objections of
parents, to protect children against immediate risks of death or permanent
damage to health when those risks can be alleviated or eliminated through
routine medical procedures. As to the child, then, it is likely that transfusion
would be ordered if failure to perform the procedure were to present a
significant risk of death or serious damage to the child's health.
Although children are presumptively incapable of consenting to medical
treatment,342 adults have both the capacity and the right to refuse unwanted
medical treatment. 343 As to the father in the hypothetical, assuming that he
shares his wife's religious beliefs, the principle issue is whether his wife's
representation of religious beliefs prohibiting transfusion constitute sufficient
evidence that the father would indeed have refused consent to the procedure
had he been conscious. 344 The wife's testimony that her husband would refuse
blood transfusion on religious grounds if he were conscious and competent to
consent would constitute strong evidence; in the absence of any contrary
evidence, a court may well enjoin the procedure. Of course, in case the
husband does not share his wife's religion, a court will not enjoin transfusion
simply because the wife holds the procedure a violation of her beliefs.
342 Except in the exceptional case of a minor seeking an abortion. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood
Association of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 432 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned
Parenthood Cen. Mo. V. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
343 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269-70, 279 (1990).
344 Cf Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 284 (upholding state statute requiring that comatose patient's preexisting wish




A religious group owns a 150-year-old church on a valuable piece of real
estate near the center of the city. The church decides to demolish the building
and construct a commercial center that will provide an ongoing source of
funds for the religious mission of the group. The group plans to use the
projected income to build a new church in a much less expensive area of the
city and to use the extra funds to finance a long standing project to provide job
training for the poor. After the group finalizes its plans, the legislature enacts
a new statute that prohibits the demolition of any building more than 125 years
old. The church wishes to proceed with its original plan. Assume that the
group's plans would have been completely legal but for the enactment of the
new law and that the new law is constitutional with respect to property rights
issues. Do the laws of the country provide any recourse for the religious group
to continue with its original plan?
The most important initial question is whether the landmarking statute is
federal or state; the hypothetical is ambiguous, referring merely to the
"parliament" as the source of the statute. Both state and federal land use
statutes are governed by RLUIPA 345; a federal statute would additionally be
governed by RFRA, which, as I have discussed, applies the compelling interest
test to any substantial government burden on religious activity.
In many respects, RLUIPA simply codifies free exercise doctrine as set
forth in Smith and Lukumi.346  For example, RLU1PA prohibits land use
regulations that treat religious groups "on less than equal terms" with
nonreligious groups or that discriminate against religious groups, which tracks
the general applicability and religious neutrality standards of the General
Rule.34 7 RLUIPA also formalizes the Individual Assessment Exception to the
General Rule.
348
In at least one important respect, however, RLUIPA goes beyond the
General Rule and its Exception. Based on Spending Clause and Commerce
Clause powers, RLUIPA applies the compelling interest test to burdens on
34' See RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc(a)(1) (prohibiting land use regulations that impose "a substantial
burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution," unless such
regulations satisfy the compelling interest test).
346 See Part VI-A supra.
147 Compare RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc(b)(1) & -(2), with Part VI-A supra.
348 Compare RLUIPA, 42. U.S.C. 2000cc(a)(2)(c), with Part VI-B supra.
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religion which occur in programs or activities that receive "Federal financial
assistance" or which affect foreign, Indian, or interstate commerce. 349 This
part of RLUIPA may be vulnerable to constitutional attack based on the
Supreme Court's recent Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence that has trimmed the traditionally expansive understanding of
federal power.
350
Assuming that the compelling interest test applies, the question would be
whether the government's interest in preserving historic structures is
compelling and thus sufficient to justify interference with the free exercise
rights of the church even under the heightened scrutiny demanded by RFRA
and RLUIPA. Religion land use cases decided under the pre-Smith and RFRA
compelling interest standard suggest that historical preservation might indeed
be a compelling interest, 351 which would leave the church in the hypothetical
with little recourse against the restrictions of the landmarking statute.
10. HUMANIST ASSOCIATION
Identify briefly the circumstances, if any, in which the laws of the country
provide religious organizations with exemptions from laws of general
applicability in order to allow religions to manifest their beliefs. For example,
are religious organizations exempted from noise ordinances and allowed to
ring church bells or amplify the muezzin's calls to prayer? Are religious
organizations exempt from tax requirements? After identifying some of the
more important exemptions, if any, explain whether "belief" associations
(such as a humanist society) are also exempted from the same laws.
The Speech Clause protects the freedom of association because of its close
352relation to the freedom of speech. A recent decision of the Supreme Court
seems to have strengthened the freedom of association, requiring that the
government defer to an association's description of its mission and its
349 See RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc(a)(2)(A) & -(B).
350 See Part VII-B.
... Cf. Tuttle, supra, note 144, at 871-76 (observing that cases zoning cases decided under the Free
Exercise Clause generally found that either the zoning decision imposed no burden on the free exercise of
religion, or that the zoning authority had a compelling interest in avoiding secondary effects like noise and
congestion that the zoning was designed to reduce or eliminate).
352 See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1958) (affirming the right to "engage in association
for the advancement of beliefs and ideas").
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determination what kind of membership exclusions are necessary to protect
that mission.3
Post-Smith free exercise doctrine generally permits government to burden
religion if it does so by laws of general applicability. In other words, after
Smith, the Free Exercise Clause simply does not mandate constitutional
exemptions. Except to the extent that exemptions are mandated by RFRA,
RLUIPA, or a state RFRA, exemptions from generally applicable laws exist
pursuant to Permissive Accommodations enacted by Congress or state or local
legislative bodies. The various patterns of Permissive Accommodation among
the fifty states and their political subdivisions are simply too numerous to
summarize.
Except in a few narrow areas, religious associations do not enjoy
exemptions that are not also available to similarly situated secular associations.
Anti-discrimination laws, for example, generally permit religious
discrimination in employment where membership in a particular church or
denomination religion is a bona fide occupational qualification, as in
leadership of a congregation of synagogue. As I have discussed, these kinds of
exemptions merely extend to religious associations to right to discriminate in
favor of applicants who are committed to the association's mission, in the same
way that secular associations already exercise such discrimination.
354
Similarly, although religious organizations are generally exempt from taxation,
so are most other nonprofit organizations that provide some activity or service
deemed to be in the public interest. 355  To the extent that religious
organizations are exempt from generally applicable laws, failure to extend
similar exemptions to similarly situated secular organizations would render the
exemption vulnerable to constitutional challenge under the Establishment
Clause.
356
The only exception to this pattern would be the Church Autonomy Cases
which, as I have indicated, function less as an exemptions than as a
jurisdictional rule that withdraws theological questions from judicial review. 357
353 Boy Scouts of Am. V. Dale, 120 S.Ct. 2446 (2000).
354 See Part IV-A supra.
355 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
356 See Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989); see also Village of Kiryas Joel Sch. Dist. v. Grumet,
512 U.S. 687, 702 (1994) (plurality opinion) (invalidating school district whose boundaries were drawn to
coincide with orthodox Jewish community because, inter alia, one could not be certain that the state would
accommodate every religious group that asked for such a district).
357 See Part IV-B supra.
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The apparent strengthening of the freedom of association and the concomitant
weakening of the principle of church autonomy suggests that this exception
may be of decreasing importance, as religious organizations placed increasing
reliance on the former rather than the latter for protection of autonomy.
358
11. PROHIBITING SOLICITATIONS
Are there any laws in the country that prohibit solicitations? For example,
are there laws that prohibit salespeople from knocking on the doors of
people's homes and apartments in order to attempt to sell them commercial
goods? Or, are there laws that prohibit people from approaching others on
the street to sell commercial goods? If there are such laws, do they contain
exemptions for religious activities? If the legislature were to enact such a law
without an exemption for religious activities, would religious individuals or
groups likely be successful in a court in obtaining an exemption from such a
law?
Laws prohibiting door-to-door solicitation in the United States have long
been found unconstitutional under the Speech Clause, on the ground that they
constitute unjustified government interference in an inexpensive means of
disseminating information and ideas that has no adequate alternative. 359 The
Court has generally required that any decision not to listen to speech or
expression be made by potential listeners, rather than by the government.
Thus, government can enforce trespassing laws against solicitors who ignore
"No Soliciting" signs posted by the residents themselves, 36 but cannot enforce
a general prohibition on soliciting. The Supreme Court recently re-affirmed
this principle. 361 Consequently, laws generally prohibiting solicitation are
likely to be invalidated on their face under the Speech Clause irrespective of
whether they are directed at religious persons or groups or contain exemptions
for such persons or groups.
358 See Gedicks, A Defensible Free Exercise Doctrine, supra note 329, at 941--44.
359 See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
360 See Struthers, 319 U.S. at 148 (characterizing no-soliciting signs posted by residents as a less
restrictive alternative protecting residential privacy).
361 Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. of N.Y v. Village of Stratton, 122 S. Ct. 2080, 2089-90 (2002).
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12. LABOR PRACTICES OF A RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATION
A private religious school hires a woman to teach mathematics to thirteen-
year-old students. The teacher belongs to the same religious faith as those
who operate the school, although the hiring policies of the school do not
explicitly require teachers to be members of the faith. After receiving a very
successful job performance evaluation at the completion of her second year,
she announces to school officials that she no longer believes in the religious
teachings of their faith and that she has become an atheist during the year.
She also says that she will not say anything about her personal beliefs to the
students, just as she had said nothing to them the preceding year. The school
immediately fires the teacher. Does the teacher have any recourse under the
laws of the country? To what extent are religious associations permitted to
make employment decisions based upon the religious convictions of the
worker?
Religious organizations are statutorily exempt from federal prohibitions
against religious discrimination in employment. This law has been held not to
violate the Establishment Clause, at least when the discrimination occurs in
connection with a religious organization's nonprofit activities."' Additionally,
under the Court's apparently revitalized doctrine of the freedom of association,
such an exemption may well be constitutionally required under the Speech
Clause even if not granted pursuant to a Permissive Accommodation.
362 Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
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